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HABITAT PROTECTION UNDER THE MAGNUSONSTEVENS ACT: CAN IT REALLY CONTRIBUTE TO
ECOSYSTEM HEALTH IN THE NORTHWEST
ATLANTIC?
Roger Fleming and Dr. John D. Crawford*

I. INTRODUCTION
New England’s legendary Atlantic cod fishery is in deep trouble. The
cod, along with several additional fish species that make up New England’s
groundfish fishery, remain critically depleted, and are at only a small
fraction of healthy levels. In 2004, the New England Fishery Management
Council (NEFMC or Council) and the National Marine Fishery Service
(NMFS) implemented the first comprehensive rebuilding program for
groundfish in New England.1 This plan relies primarily on management
measures designed to reduce fishing rates in order to end overfishing and
rebuild overfished stocks.2 The most recent scientific review by the

*. Roger Fleming is a Senior Attorney at the Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) in
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Vermont Law School, and is located in CLF’s Brunswick, Maine Office. John D. Crawford,
Ph.D., Cornell University, is Senior Scientist in CLF’s Ocean Conservation Program. Mr.
Crawford is located in CLF’s Boston Office.
1. NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, FINAL AMENDMENT 13 TO THE
NORTHEAST MULTISPECIES FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN INCLUDING A FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT AND AN INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
ANALYSIS (Dec. 2003), available at http://www.nefmc.org/nemulti/index.html (follow
“Final Amendment 13-December 2003” hyperlink) [hereinafter FINAL AMENDMENT 13].
2. Id. at I-82 to I-91 (The principle management measure used to control fishing
mortality in New England is regulation of the number of days fishermen can spend at sea
fishing in each fishing year. Examples of other management measures relied upon in New
England include gear limitations and area closures. These types of measures are often
referred to as “input controls” because they are designed to limit the amount of “fishing
effort,” such as the number of days fished and the number of fishermen placed into the
fishery. These measures fall short of “output controls,” which put actual limits on the
amount of fish removed from the fishery.).
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National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Fisheries’
Northeast Fisheries Science Center (NEFSC) released in 2005, however,
showed that overfishing was still occurring on several groundfish species,
including the Georges Bank and Gulf of Maine cod stocks.3 Their levels
had plummeted another twenty-five and twenty-one percent respectively
since the last comprehensive NEFSC review in 2001, leaving them at only
ten and twenty-three percent of the target levels that scientists consider the
minimum for health and sustainability.4 The continued depletion of New
England’s critical groundfish populations is not only bad news for the fish,
but also for coastal New England fishermen and their communities, who
face economic hardship caused by regulators’ attempts to end overfishing.
While ending overfishing is clearly a fundamental first step in
addressing our fisheries problems,5 the healthy growth and development of
juvenile fish is essential to rebuilding sustainable commercial fisheries and
the healthy ecosystems fish require. Habitat is necessary to fish for food,
shelter, and reproduction, and demersal (groundfish) juveniles are particularly dependent upon sea floor structure for predator evasion and energy
conservation.6 Numerous scientific studies have demonstrated that many
different types of fishing gear—especially bottom trawls and dredges but
also gillnets, traps, longlines and other gear—degrade critical fish habitat

3. NORTHEAST FISHERIES SCIENCE CENTER, A REPORT OF THE STOCK ASSESSMENT
WORKSHOP, 2005 GROUNDFISH ASSESSMENT REVIEW MEETING vi-viii (Sept. 2005)
[hereinafter 2005 GARM].
4. Id. at 2-3, 2-4, 2-156.
5. Ratana Chuenpagdee et al., Shifting Gears: Assessing Collateral Impacts of Fishing
Methods in U.S. Waters, FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 517 (2003).
6. See R. GREGORY LOUGH, ATLANTIC COD, GADUS MORHUA, LIFE HISTORY AND
HABITAT CHARACTERISTICS EDITION 91 (2nd ed. 2004) (structures provided by benthic
epifauna and abiotic relief, such as sand-waves, offer shelter from predators and prevailing
currents); P. J. Auster et al., Use of Sand Wave Habitats by Silver Hake, 62 JOURNAL OF FISH
BIOLOGY 143, 143-152 (2003); Vytenis Gotceitas & Joseph A. Brown, Substrate Selection
By Juvenile Atlantic Cod (Gadus-Morhua) - Effects of Predation Risk, 93 OCEOLOGIA 31,
31-37 (Feb. 1993); J. B. Lindholm et al., Habitat Mediated Survivorship of Juvenile (0-year)
Atlantic Cod Gadus morhua, 180 MARINE ECOLOGY 247 (1999); J. B. Lindholm, Juvenile
Fish Responses to Variations in Seafloor Habitats: Modeling the Effects of Fishing and
Implications for the Design of Marine Protected Areas, 15 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 424
(2001); M. Tupper & R. G. Boutilier, Effects of Habitat on Settlement, Growth, and
Postsettlement Survival of Atlantic Cod (Gadus-Morhua), 52 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF
FISHERIES AND AQUATIC SCIENCES 1834 (1995); C. L. Gerstner, Use of Substratum Ripples
for Flow Refuging by Atlantic Cod, Gadus Morhua, 51 ENVIRONMENTAL BIOLOGY OF
FISHES 455 (1988); R. G. Lough & G. R. Bolz, The Movement of Cod and Haddock Larvae
onto the Shoals of Georges Bank, 35 JOURNAL OF FISH BIOLOGY 71 (1989).
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which can lead to declines in fish populations.7 As a result, certain fishing
gear should be restricted in sensitive habitat areas to protect juvenile fish
habitat and to help ensure that marine fish populations are restored to
healthy levels for years to come.8
Ten years after the Sustainable Fisheries Act9 was enacted in 1996 to
strengthen the conservation provisions of our nation’s fisheries law,
protections for Essential Fish Habitat (EFH) from harmful fishing practices
remain inadequate. Over this time period, the NEFMC, like most of our
nation’s fishery management councils, has demonstrated all the classic
failures of protecting habitat by hiding behind scientific uncertainty,
maintaining that existing management measures are sufficient, limiting
prohibitions of destructive gear to where it currently is not a threat, and
providing limited protection for some of the most vulnerable habitat types
while ignoring other important areas.10
The NEFMC itself appears to recognize that it has fallen short in
fulfilling the conservation promise offered in the habitat provisions added
by the Sustainable Fisheries Act. The NEFMC is currently developing an
omnibus habitat amendment designed to review and update its EFH

7. See P. J. Auster & R. W. Langton, The Effects of Fishing on Fish Habitat, AM. FISH
SOC’Y SYMPOSIUM 150-87 (1999) [hereinafter Auster & Langton 1999]; P. J. Auster et al.,
The Impacts of Mobile Fishing Gear on Sea Floor Habitats in the Gulf of Maine (Northwest
Atlantic): Implications for Conservation of Fish Populations, 4 REVIEWS IN FISHERIES
SCIENCE 185-202 (1996) [hereinafter Auster et al., 1996]; J. S. Collie et al., Effects of
Bottom Fishing on the Benthis Megafauna of Georges Bank, 155 MARINE ECOLOGY
PROGRESS SERIES 159-172 (1997) [hereinafter Collie et al., 1997]; J. S. Collie et al.,
Photographic Evaluation of the Impacts of Bottom Fishing on Benthic Epifauna, 57 ICES
JOURNAL OF MARINE SCIENCE 987-1001 (2000) [hereinafter Collie et al., 2000a]; J. S. Collie
et al., A Quantitative Analysis of Fishing Impacts on Shelf-Sea Benthos, 69 JOURNAL OF
ANIMAL ECOLOGY 785-98 (2000) [hereinafter Collie et al., 2000b]; J. M. Hermsen et al.,
Mobile Fishing Gear Reduces Benthic Megafaunal Production on Georges Bank, 260
MARINE ECOLOGY P ROGRESS SERIES 97-108 (2003); J. Lindholm et al., Role of a Large
Marine Protected Area for Conserving Landscape Attributes of Sand Habitats on Georges
Bank (NW Atlantic), 269 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 61-68 (2004); Chuenpagdee
et al., supra note 5, at 517-24; Paul K. Dayton et al., PEW OCEANS COMM’N, ECOLOGICAL
EFFECTS OF FISHING IN MARINE ECOSYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES 24 (2002), available
at http://www.pewtrusts.org/pdf/ environment_ pew_oceans_effects_fishing.pdf.
8. PEW OCEANS COMM’N, AMERICA’S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE FOR SEA
CHANGE 47, 111-12 (May 2003), available at http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdf/env_
pew_oceans_final_report.pdf.
9. Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996).
10. MARINE FISH CONSERVATION NETWORK, RAY OF HOPE: SUCCESSES AND
SHORTCOMINGS IN PROTECTING ESSENTIAL FISH HABITAT 1-2 (2006), available at
http://www.conservefish.org/site/pubs/network_reports/efh_rayofhope_lowres.pdf.
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designations and to consider new actions designed to protect habitat.11
Recently, in response to a request for proposals to identify habitat areas of
particular concern in New England waters, the Conservation Law
Foundation (CLF) and World Wildlife Fund-Canada (WWF-Canada)
developed an innovative new strategy to restore New England’s depleted
cod and other groundfish populations. These groups proposed creating a
network of Habitat Areas of Particular Concern (HAPC), locations where
large concentrations of young fish from eight struggling, overfished species,
such as Atlantic cod, hake, and yellowtail flounder live (the Multi-species
HAPC proposal).12 With the aid of a powerful computer modeling tool, the
groups generated a unique, objective, and science-based proposal that seeks
to restore and protect areas that provide critical habitat for many species at
the same time, thus keeping the number of isolated habitat sites to a
minimum. If implemented, the result would be an efficient system that
conserves critical areas with large numbers of juvenile fish while
minimizing the impacts to U.S. and Canadian fishermen.
Unfortunately, when called upon to recognize the areas identified in the
Multi-species HAPC proposal as HAPCs and to take action to protect them,
the NEFMC abruptly set the proposal aside despite the strong support of the
leading habitat scientists advising the Council. This rejection by the
Council, which is overseeing the demise of one of the world’s legendary
fishing grounds, is especially frustrating given modern scientific
understanding of the value of habitat protection as the key component of
ecological health. This rejection calls into question whether the MagnusonStevens Act’s13 habitat provisions are an adequate tool to help stop the
decline of our ocean ecosystems and for restoring such ecosystems to a
reasonable approximation of what they once were.
This Article looks at the implementation of the Magnuson-Stevens
Act’s habitat provisions through the prism of the New England groundfish
fishery. The fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic, under the oversight of the
NEFMC, have played a pivotal role as case studies for Congress throughout
the Magnuson-Stevens Act’s history. Examining the New England fishery
allows us to evaluate where managers have delivered on the Act’s habitat

11. See New England Fishery Management Council, Habitat/Marine Protected Areas,
http://www.nefmc.org/habitat/index.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
12. JOHN CRAWFORD & ROGER FLEMING, CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION, HABITAT
AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: A MULTI-SPECIES APPROACH FOR JUVENILES OF EIGHT
OVER-FISHED SPECIES - REVISED P ROPOSAL (May 12, 2005), available at
http://www.nefmc.org/habitat/groundfish_species_HAPC_proposal_june05.pdf.
13. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
1801–1883 (2000).
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conservation promises, where they have fallen short, and where one might
look to begin to chart a better course for the health of our oceans. The
Council’s failures also help bring into focus the need for new tools for
restoring and protecting ecological health, the need for reform of the
nation’s fishery management councils, and the need for a broader approach
to ocean governance.
II. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
When passed in 1976, the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (FCMA or Magnuson Act) ushered in a new era of federal
fishery management in the United States.14 Driven in part by alarm at the
biological effects of foreign fishing in the northwest Atlantic and in part by
a desire to capture the economic and social benefits of those fisheries for
Americans, the Magnuson Act specified, without explicitly prioritizing,
seven “national standards” for managing fisheries in the new 200-mile
offshore “fishery conservation zone.”15 These standards represented the
multiple, and sometimes competing, interests inherent in the long-term
management of this economically valuable public resource.
In addition to the national standards, the management structure created
under FCMA established eight regional fishery management councils to
regulate commercial and recreational fishing.16 In order to facilitate
meeting FCMA’s primary goals of developing the American fishing
industry and phasing out foreign fishing, Congress gave the commercial
fishing industry a leading role in writing fishery management rules. The
regional fishery management councils were filled with fishing industry
representatives, as well as state and federal regulators.17 The Magnuson Act
vested responsibility in the councils for developing and recommending
fishery management measures to NMFS through fishery management plans
(FMPs), and NMFS in turn received the more limited authority to approve,
disapprove, or partially approve the councils’ recommendations.18 Under
this structure, which remains in place today, in the vast majority of cases
NMFS approved the councils’ recommendations demonstrating that the

14.
15.
16.
17.

16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (1976).
Id. § 1851.
Id. § 1852(a).
JOSH EAGLE ET AL., TAKING STOCK OF THE REGIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT
COUNCILS 12, 24-26 (2003), available at http://fisheries.stanford.edu/Stanford_Council_
Report.pdf.
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a)(3) (1976).
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industry dominated councils are the de facto regulators of U.S. ocean
fisheries.19
Federal fishery policy established under the Magnuson Act’s structure
struggled to strike the proper balance between conservation and economic
development of the ocean resources. The regional fishery management
councils, including New England’s, often seemed to flounder on the various
policy choices reflected in the national standards, but not ranked by
Congress, resulting in widely different strategies, practices, and
consequences.20
III. THE NEW ENGLAND GROUNDFISH FISHERY—
FROM LEGEND TO IGNOMINY
The Atlantic codfish (Gadhus morhua) that inhabit the rich fishing
grounds off New England and Eastern Canadian shores provided a boon to
European settlers. Cod was so abundant that by the mid-sixteenth century,
sixty percent of all fish eaten in Europe was cod and this remained true for
the next two centuries.21 European demand propelled the cod fishery to
world status by the eighteenth century, creating the so-called “codfish
aristocracy” of Boston.22
New England’s cod fishery owes its historic prosperity to the fact that
it is part of one of the world’s most productive and unique marine ecosystems. The defining characteristic of this ecosystem is Georges Bank, a
large submarine plateau located off New England’s coast. Georges Bank
forms the off-shore boundary of New England’s own semi-enclosed sea
known as the Gulf of Maine. Cold, nutrient-rich waters from the Labrador
current flow from the North and mingle with warm Gulf stream waters in
the shallow areas on Georges Bank. Here, sunlight penetrates the water
column, providing the ideal habitat for phytoplankton, which on Georges
Bank grows three times faster than on any other continental shelf.23 This
phytoplankton production fuels a highly productive food web on Georges
Bank and in the Gulf of Maine, where the Atlantic codfish traditionally

19. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 17, at 32.
20. Susan Hanna, The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act: Retrospect
and Prospect, 9 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 211 passim (1996).
21. American Museum of Natural History, Science Bulletins, Will the Fish Return? How
Gear and Greed Emptied Georges Bank, http://sciencebulletins.amnh.org/biobulletin/
biobulletin/story1227.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
22. D. A. Farnie, The Commercial Empire of the Atlantic 1607-1783, 15 THE ECONOMIC
HISTORY REVIEW 205, 205-18 (1962).
23. American Museum of Natural History, Science Bulletins, supra note 21.
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reigned as the top predator. The unique oceanographic features of Georges
Bank and the Gulf of Maine not only fueled a cod-ecosystem, but the cod
and other groundfish like flounder and haddock in turn supported the
fisheries that helped give rise to our nation.24
Despite the biological productivity of this ecosystem, overfishing has
strained this rich natural resource. Many New England fishermen and
coastal communities still depend on New England’s fisheries for their
livelihood; the Atlantic cod, however, is no longer king.25 Moreover, the
legendary status of the New England groundfish fishery that helped give
rise to a nation has been transformed to what some have referred to as the
national poster child for poor fisheries management.26
For hundreds of years, the New England groundfish fishery was
characterized by an abundance and diversity of target fish species, and a
variety of fishing vessels and gear types used by fishing communities
spread throughout the different ports in the region.27 In New England the
term “groundfish” refers to a multi-species complex of twelve species of
bottom dwelling fish, managed as nineteen different fish populations.28

24. See generally, MARK KURLANSKY, COD: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FISH THAT CHANGED
(1997).
25. For a review of the history and first twenty-eight years of New England federal
management history under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, see Peter Shelley et al., The New
England Fisheries Crisis: What Have We Learned?, 9 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 221, 223–33 (1996),
and Roger Fleming et al., Twenty-Eight Years and Counting: Can the Magnuson Act Deliver
on Its Conservation Promise?, 28 VERMONT L. REV. 579, 581-599 (2004).
26. See, e.g., Judith Layzer, Fish Stories: Science, Advocacy, and Policy Change in New
England Fishery Management, 34 POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL 59 (Feb. 2006).
27. The majority of the fishing effort in New England waters comes from Maine, New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York, although boats
hailing from all along the Atlantic seaboard have participated in the rich Georges Bank and
Great South Channel fisheries over the years. See generally NORTHEAST REGIONAL OFFICE
OF THE NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, FISHERY STATISTICS OFFICE, NORTHEAST
PRELIMINARY FISHERIES STATISTICS (2006), available at http://www.nero.noaa.gov/ro/
fso/mul.htm.
28. The twelve species currently included in the Northeast Multi-Species Fishery
Management Plan are Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua), witch flounder (Glyptocephalus
cynoglossus), American plaice (Hippoglossoides platessoides), yellowtail flounder (Limanda
ferruginea), haddock (Melanogrammus aegletinus), pollock (Pollachius virens), winter
flounder (Pseudopleuronectes americanus), windowpane flounder (Scophthalmus aquosus),
redfish (Sebastes fasciatus), white hake (Urophycis tenuis), Atlantic halibut (Hippoglossus
hippoglossus), and ocean pout (Macrozoarces americanus). Atlantic cod are further
managed as two sub-populations: Georges Bank cod and Gulf of Maine cod; yellowtail
flounder are managed as three sub-populations: Southern New England/Mid-Atlantic
yellowtail flounder, Cape Cod/Gulf of Maine yellowtail flounder, and Georges Bank
yellowtail flounder; haddock are managed as two sub-populations: Georges Bank haddock
THE WORLD
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These species frequently share the same habitat and are susceptible to being
caught by the same fishing gear.29
During the 1980s and 1990s, New England groundfish stocks fell into
precipitous decline: from 1983-1993, total Northeast landings of the
principle groundfish stocks fell sixty percent; Northeast commercial
landings of cod declined nearly fifty-five percent.30 Heavy fishing pressure
on the New England groundfish complex reduced the estimated total
biomass of the twelve groundfish species to the lowest aggregate levels ever
recorded by scientists.31 A groundbreaking 1991 federal district court
victory resulted in an order to the NEFMC to develop and implement an
amendment to the FMP designed to stop this decline by ending overfishing
on cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder populations.32 This plan amendment, implemented in 1994 and known as Amendment 5 to the Northeast
Multi-species (groundfish) Fishery Management Plan (Northeast Multispecies FMP), focused on reducing fishing effort by, among other things,
ending entry into the fishery by vessels greater than forty-five feet,
increasing the mesh size of the fishing gear, creating seasonal and yearround area closures, and reducing over a period of years the number of days
that fishermen would have available to go fishing for groundfish.33 These
effort controls are fundamentally the same types of management measures
relied upon in New England today.
Unfortunately, these changes came too late to stem the tide of collapse
in New England’s groundfish population. In 1994, scientists reported that
Georges Bank haddock and southern New England yellowtail flounder
stocks had collapsed and that the Georges Bank cod stock was in “imminent
danger” of collapse.34 Between 1993 and 1995, landings of cod fell sixty-

and Gulf of Maine haddock; windowpane flounder are managed as two sub-populations:
Southern New England/Mid-Atlantic windowpane flounder and Gulf of Maine/Georges
Bank windowpane flounder; and winter flounder are managed as three sub-populations:
Southern New England/Mid-Atlantic winter flounder, Georges Bank winter flounder, and
Gulf of Maine winter flounder. See 2005 GARM, supra note 3, at 1-1, 1-4.
29. These characteristics of the fish complex make the development of management
measures that try to direct fishing effort away from vulnerable, overfished populations of
fish and toward healthier, rebuilt populations extremely challenging. These management
measures are often only marginally effective at avoiding the “bycatch” of the non-target
species.
30. See Shelley et al., supra note 25, at 224.
31. See id. at 225, 230–32.
32. Id. at 229.
33. Id. at 230.
34. See Fleming et al., supra note 25, at 582 (quoting NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES
SERVICE, REPORT OF THE 18TH NORTHEAST REGIONAL STOCK ASSESSMENT WORKSHOP, THE
PLENARY 42, 53 (1994)).
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six percent from 23,113 metric tons (mt) to an all time low of 7859 mt.35
NMFS issued an unprecedented special advisory for Georges Bank
groundfish declaring that Amendment 5 was “clearly inadequate” to prevent
the collapse of cod or allow the rebuilding of yellowtail flounder.36 The
advisory directed managers to reduce fishing mortality for these two species
“to as low a level as possible, approaching zero.”37 Following these grim
reports of actual and impending stock collapses, NMFS, through emergency
action, closed over 6500 square miles of Georges Bank and southern New
England waters to fishing.38
As the NEFMC struggled to establish fishing mortality targets that if
achieved would rebuild the major groundfish stocks and to develop a suite
of management measures that would reduce fishing pressure enough to meet
the targets,39 the social and economic costs of the historical mismanagement
of the groundfish complex were mounting rapidly throughout the region.
Traditional groundfishing ports in downeast Maine, such as Stonington and
Eastport, stopped participating in the fishery because of the combination of
the lack of viable fish populations within reach of their smaller boats and
the attraction of the strong lobster fishery in coastal waters.40 Groundfish
landings by vessels remaining in the fishery declined for all managed
species between fifteen and sixty-three percent between 1993 and 1995.41
These declines were the result of a combination of low biological
abundance of the species and the mounting management measures designed
to reduce fishing mortality. Despite the decreased landings, the NEFMC’s
science advisors estimated that another seventeen percent reduction on
average in fishing mortality were needed in 1997 on cod, haddock, and
yellowtail flounder.42
Against this backdrop, most members of the New England congressional delegation chose to ignore the universal consensus of the scientific
community that reducing fishing mortality was critical to reversing the

35. See 2005 GARM, supra note 3, at 2-8.
36. See Fleming et al., supra note 25, at 582.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Northeast Multi-Species Fishery, 59 Fed. Reg. 63,926 (Dec. 12, 1994)).
39. See Northeast Multi-Species Fishery, Amendment 7 Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 27,71011, 27,714 (May 31, 1996). Amendment 7 sought to cut fishing mortality on stocks of cod,
haddock, and yellowtail flounder by some eighty percent over a two-year period from the
estimated 1993 mortality levels and extended the emergency closure. Northeast MultiSpecies Fishery, Amendment 7 Proposed Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 8540, 8541-2, 8559 (Mar. 5,
1996).
40. See Fleming et al., supra note 25, at 583.
41. See id. at 583-84.
42. Id. at 584.
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declines in groundfish populations, and pressured the Department of
Commerce not to implement further mortality reductions.43 There was a
strong conservation tenor to the discussions in Congress at this time over
reauthorization of the FCMA, and bi-partisan support for major fisheries
management reform. It might seem surprising, therefore, that New
England’s congressional delegation would support efforts to stall actions
designed to begin the recovery of groundfish populations in New England.
This illustrates, however, the strong emotional hold that commercial fishing
has on members of Congress and the sensitivity that congressional leaders
have for the plight of the constituent fishing communities in their districts.
IV. THE SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES ACT OF 1996
While New England struggled to develop an effective groundfish FMP
that met the FCMA’s original conservation objectives, the congressional
debate over reauthorization and reform of the Magnuson Act heated up in
the mid-1990s.44 Despite success in court that caused NMFS to begin to
address overfishing in New England and elsewhere,45 conservationists concluded that the original statute was structurally flawed and incapable of
producing sustainable fisheries. The FCMA not only failed to provide the
framework for producing long-term sustainable fisheries through ecosystem-based fisheries management, its resource development objectives
were promoting the very excessive fishing practices and other unsound
stewardship practices that were defeating the conservation objectives of the
Act.46
Existing FCMA provisions allowed regional management councils to
set fishing levels above those that were biologically sustainable in order to
meet short-term economic or social demands,47 and they did not set any
meaningful expectations for rebuilding overfished fish populations.
Further, it was well known that bycatch (the catch and discard of non-target
fish, mammals, and ocean birds) was resulting in tremendous waste, yet the

43. Id.
44. Suzanne Iudicello et al., Putting Conservation into the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act: The Public Interest in Magnuson Reauthorization, 9 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.
339, 341 (1996).
45. Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Mosbacher, No. 91-11759-MA, 1991 WL 501640
(D. Mass. Aug. 28, 1991); aff'd Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39
(1st Cir. 1992).
46. Iudicello et al., supra note 44, at 342.
47. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1801(6)(5)(B) (1994)).
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FCMA was entirely silent on bycatch.48 Finally, the FCMA paid no
meaningful attention to habitat protection, requiring only that FMPs
“include readily available information regarding the effects of habitat
alteration on fisheries and that councils comment and make recommendations on activities . . . likely to impact anadromous fish habitat.”49
Overfishing during the first twenty years under the FCMA resulted in
high levels of bycatch and destruction of fish habitat and pushed many
marine fish populations to unsustainably low levels.50 In an unprecedented
effort to address protection of the public’s common interest in marine fish
resources, more than 100 organizations representing conservationists,
recreational fishermen, and a number of frustrated, smaller scale coastal
fishermen organized as the Marine Fish Conservation Network.51 These
groups descended on Congress seeking to change the focus of the FCMA
from promoting fishing to conserving fish. They sought reform of fisheries
management in three key areas: overfishing, bycatch, and habitat protection.52
During an era in which a Republican-controlled Congress was in the
midst of a series of unprecedented “attempts to roll back America's environmental laws,”53 a unanimous Senate and a nearly unanimous House
responded, reauthorizing and amending the FCMA by enacting the
Sustainable Fisheries Act of 199654 (SFA) (renaming the FCMA the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act)
(Magnuson-Stevens Act). The SFA made significant amendments to the

48. Id. at 343. Worldwide, scientists have estimated that fishermen discarded about
twenty-five percent of what they caught during the 1980s and the early 1990s, totaling
approximately sixty billion pounds each year. D. L. ALVERSON ET AL., A GLOBAL
ASSESSMENT OF F ISHERIES BYCATCH AND DISCARDS (1994), available at
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/T4890E/T4890E02.htm#ch1.1.5. In the United States in
2002, the bycatch in twenty-seven of the nation’s most important fisheries totaled more than
two billion pounds, although the full magnitude of the problem is unknown because bycatch
monitoring remains very poor despite federal legal requirements. See MARINE FISH
CONSERVATION NETWORK, TURNING A BLIND EYE: THE ‘SEE NO EVIL’ APPROACH TO
WASTEFUL FISHING 1 (2006), available at http://www.conservefish.org/site/pubs/network_
reports/blindeye_lowres.pdf.
49. Iudicello et al., supra note 44, at 343-44.
50. At the time of the reauthorization debate, NOAA Fisheries estimated that of the 231
federally recognized fish stocks nationwide, 65 were overfished, 71 were fully exploited,
and the status of 42 stocks were unknown. Id. at 341.
51. Marine Fish Conservation Network, http://www.conservefish.org/ (last visited Dec.
15, 2006).
52. Iudicello et al., supra note 44, at 342.
53. Id. at 339.
54. Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (Oct. 11, 1996).
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FCMA; it was designed to cure a number of structural deficiencies and gaps
in the original legislation in order to “to conserve and manage the fishery
resources found off the coasts of the United States.”55
The SFA substantially rewrote the FCMA’s national standards and
related provisions in a number of areas.56 The most important change was
the revised definition of “optimal yield,” making it clear that fishing
mortality has to be set at rates that are no greater than the rate that will
produce maximum sustainable yield, a change from prior law that allowed
rates to be set above sustainable yield as a result of social, economic, or
ecological factors.57 This was a significant change to fishery management
philosophy and made clear that Congress recognized that the greater
flexibility that was allowed under the FCMA was undercutting the longterm objectives of producing high yield, sustainable fisheries.58 The new
definition also specified that the optimum yield from a fishery that was
overfished had to be set at a level that “provides for rebuilding to a level
consistent with producing the maximum sustainable yield in such fishery.”59

55. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1) (2000).
56. While Congressional amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act substantially
improved the statutory framework for fisheries management in the United States, it must be
stressed that the Act remains fundamentally a resource development statute. Conservation
objectives from that perspective are not advanced for their own intrinsic merit, or for
scientific purposes; but rather they are advanced as necessary conditions for protecting the
“valuable and renewable natural resources . . . [that] contribute to the food supply, economy,
and health of the Nation and provide recreational opportunities.” 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1)
(2000).
57. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(28)-(29) (2000). Fishing mortality rates could still be reduced
below the rate that would produce maximum sustainable yield as a result of social,
economic, or ecological factors. Id. For a technical discussion of this important change, see
Fleming et al., supra note 25, at 586-87.
58. This issue was extensively debated by Congress and the vote on the amendments that
established maximum sustainable yield as an upper boundary for optimal yield passed 304113 in the House of Representatives. See Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions, National
Standard Guidelines, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,212, 24,216 (May 1, 1998) (NOAA Fisheries
commenting on debate of Optimal Yield/Maximum Sustainable Yield).
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(28)(c) (2000). In the New England rebuilding plan established in
2003, Amendment 13, the NEFMC elected to “phase-in” over time the fishing rate
reductions necessary to rebuild some overfished stocks within the specified rebuilding time
frame in order to reduce economic and social impacts at the beginning of the rebuilding
program. FINAL AMENDMENT 13, supra note 1, at I-35. Even though this approach arguably achieves the same rebuilding objective on paper, the change in the definition of
optimum yield in the SFA appears to clearly prohibit fishing effort at levels higher than the
maximum sustainable yield. In taking this approach, the NEFMC sought to take advantage
of apparently contradictory language in the Magnuson-Stevens Act’s rebuilding section,
which states that fisheries councils must “specify a time period for ending overfishing” for
overfished fisheries, i.e., bringing fishing mortality rates below the rates that will produce
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Rebuilding the nation’s depleted fish populations was a major focus of
the SFA. The cornerstone of the new Magnuson-Stevens Act’s approach
to rebuilding fish populations is its requirements: (1) that each FMP specify
“objective and measurable criteria”60 for determining when a stock is
overfished61 or when overfishing62 is occurring; and (2) that each FMP
establish mandatory measures for rebuilding an overfished stock by a
certain time or implement measures to prevent overfishing in a situation
where the relevant fishery is approaching the overfishing or overfished
threshold.63 Congress directed that such rebuilding programs should be “as
short as possible” but “not [to] exceed ten years [with certain exceptions].”64
The SFA also added National Standard 9, which requires managers to
avoid or minimize bycatch.65 In addition to the obvious waste of fish and
other marine life resulting from bycatch, it can also impede efforts to
achieve sustainable fisheries by increasing the uncertainty in measuring
total fishing-related mortality, making it more difficult to accurately assess
the status of stocks, set appropriate fishing levels, and ensure they are met.

maximum sustainable yield (Fmsy). 16 U.S.C. § 1854(e)(4)(A) (2000). An approach to
fisheries management that allows for the heaviest fishing pressure to be applied to the stocks
that are most depleted would seem to make little sense. From a biological perspective such
continued high fishing mortality increases the biological risk to these more threatened
stocks. See ANDREW I. L. PAYNE, UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, REPORT ON THE
GROUNDFISH SCIENCE PEER REVIEW MEETING 15-18 (2003), available at http://www.nefsc.
noaa.gov/groundfish/Payne.pdf (suggesting that it is better to have mortality rates lower than
Fmsy). Nonetheless, in a somewhat illogical opinion, this approach was upheld in one
district court. The court held that overfishing can continue for a period of time so long as
the rebuilding plan’s overall timeframe is achieved. Oceana v. Evans, 2005 WL 555416,
13 (D.D.C. 2005).
60. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(10) (2000).
61. A stock is “overfished” or subject to “overfishing” when the “rate or level of fishing
mortality . . . jeopardizes the capacity of a fishery to produce the maximum sustainable yield
on a continuing basis.” Id. § 1802(29).
62. Based on the NOAA Fisheries guidelines for implementing National Standard 1,
overfishing of a stock is defined in relation to whether the fishing mortality rate is above a
prescribed threshold as established within a fisheries management plan. Magnuson-Stevens
Act Provisions, 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(d)(ii) (2005).
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(e)(3) (2000).
64. Id. § 1854(e)(4)(A)(i)-(ii).
65. “Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, (A)
minimize bycatch and (B) to the extent bycatch can not be avoided, minimize the mortality
of such bycatch.” Id. § 1851(a)(9). Bycatch is defined as “fish which are harvested in a
fishery, but which are not sold or kept for personal use.” Id. § 1802(2). The SFA definition
of “bycatch” includes finfish and sea turtles, but not marine mammals or sea birds.
Sustainable Fisheries Act, supra note 54, § 102(2).
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Bycatch can also preclude more productive uses of fishery resources.66 The
Magnuson-Stevens Act requires all FMPs to “establish a standardized
reporting methodology to assess the amount and type of bycatch occurring
in the fishery, and include conservation and management measures”
adequate to meet the bycatch minimization standard.67
Finally, Congress made new habitat-related findings in response to the
growing evidence that the productive capacity of the nation’s oceans was
suffering long term degradation from the effects of fishing gear and other
perturbations of bottom habitat. Congress found that “[c]ertain stocks of
fish have declined to the point where their survival is threatened, and other
stocks of fish have been so substantially reduced in number that they could
become similarly threatened as a consequence of . . . direct and indirect
habitat losses which have resulted in a diminished capacity to support
existing fishing levels.”68 Congress also found that “[o]ne of the greatest
long-term threats to the viability of commercial and recreational [species]
is the continu[ed] loss of marine, estuarine, and other aquatic habitats,”69
and that a “national program for the conservation and management of the
fishery resources of the United States is necessary . . . to facilitate long-term
protection of essential fish habitats . . . .”70
While Congress chose not to articulate national standard language with
respect to habitat protection, the SFA added new habitat protection provisions requiring councils to “describe and identify essential fish habitat
[EFH] for the fishery based on the guidelines established by the Secretary

66. 50 C.F.R. § 600.350(b) (2005).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(11) (2000). The NEFMC has been successfully sued twice for
its failure to establish a standardized bycatch reporting methodology in its groundfish
fishery. Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001); Oceana v.
Evans, 2005 WL 555416. The Council is now preparing a methodology and it is anticipated
to be completed in 2007. NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, STANDARDIZED
BYCATCH REPORTING COMMITTEE, TIMELINE, http://www.nefmc.org/issues/sbrm/revised_
timeline.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(2)(C) (2000).
69. Id. § 1801(a)(9).
70. Id. § 1801(a)(6). Based on these findings, Congress also declared that a new purpose
of the Magnuson-Stevens Act is “to promote the protection of essential fish habitat in the
review of projects conducted under Federal permits, licenses, or other authorities that affect
or have the potential to affect such habitat.” Id. § 1801(b)(7). Such activities could include
dredging channels, filling wetlands, building docks, or discharging pollutants. Other federal
agencies are required to respond to NMFS’ or the councils’ recommendations within thirty
days. Id. § 1855(b)(4)(B). While this consultative authority to minimize non-fishing
impacts on EFH gave NMFS and the councils an important new tool, the requirement to
minimize fishing impacts was the most significant change to the Magnuson-Stevens Act’s
habitat requirements because fishing is directly regulated by NMFS and the councils.
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under [the Act], minimize to the extent practicable adverse effects on such
habitat caused by fishing, and identify other actions to encourage the
conservation and enhancement of such habitat.”71 This is the action forcing
standard that NMFS and the regional councils must meet in their fishery
management plans. Councils must assess the adverse impacts of all fishing
gear used in their regions and consider practicable alternatives for minimizing those impacts.72 Alternatives could include prohibiting harmful gear
such as bottom trawls and dredges in sensitive locations, modifying gear to
reduce impacts, closing areas to all or specific types of fishing gear, or
reducing catch.73 Congress, aware of the fishery managers’ history of delay,
also required the councils to submit EFH amendments for FMPs to NMFS
within two years.74
The definition of “essential fish habitat” frames the scope of habitat
protections under the Magnuson-Stevens Act.75 Congress defined this term
expansively as “those waters and substrate necessary to fish for spawning,
breeding, feeding or growth to maturity.”76 Notably, Congress also broadly
defined the term “fish” to include “finfish, mollusks, crustaceans, and all
other forms of marine animal and plant life other than marine mammals and
birds.”77 In an effort to focus EFH protection, NMFS’ regulations further
encourage councils to identify “habitat areas of particular concern”
(HAPC), which are intended to highlight specific habitat areas that are
important ecologically, sensitive to degradation, under stress by development, or rare, and therefore should receive heightened attention by fisheries
regulators when considering measures to protect EFH.78
The SFA amendments appeared to set national fisheries policy firmly
on the path of achieving maximum long-term economic benefits to the
nation by mandating the rebuilding and protection of fish populations and

71. Id. § 1853(a)(7). NMFS’ regulations further define these as impacts that are “more
than minimal and not temporary in nature.” 50 C.F.R. § 600.815(a)(2)(ii) (2005).
72. 50 C.F.R. § 600.815(a)(2)(i) (2005).
73. Id. § 600.815(a)(2)(iv).
74. Pub. L. No. 104-297, § 108(b), 110 Stat. 3575. This section reads: “Not later than
24 months after the date of enactment of this Act, each Regional Fishery Management
Council shall submit to the Secretary of Commerce amendments to each fishery
management plan under its authority to comply with the amendments made in subsection
(a) of [section 1853].” Id. Councils are required to review and update EFH descriptions and
identifications at least once every five years. 50 C.F.R. § 600.815(a)(10) (2005).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(10) (2000).
76. EFH is defined as “those waters and substrate necessary to fish for spawning,
breeding, feeding, or growth to maturity.” Id.
77. Id. § 1802(12).
78. 50 C.F.R. § 600.815(a)(8)(i)-(iv) (2005).
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by protecting the marine habitats upon which they depend. Earlier
ambiguities in the law between the values to be placed on economic activity
and protecting fish populations were resolved in favor of conservation.
Although efforts to end overfishing and rebuild groundfish stocks under the
FCMA came too late to prevent New England’s fabled groundfish
populations from hitting historic low levels in the mid-1990s,79 the SFA
required the NEFMC and fishery management councils around the country
to develop new FMPs that complied with the new and improved MagnusonStevens Act. NMFS published guidelines for the new national standards on
May 1, 1998,80 and the SFA required councils to come into compliance with
the new provisions within two years of enactment on October 11, 1998.81
Despite this promise, within three years conservation organizations in
New England and elsewhere had to return to court to attempt to force
compliance with the new provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.82 It was
quickly evident that not even an unequivocal congressional mandate was
sufficient to budge the intransigent vested interests embedded in the federal
fishery process and produce the sustainable, healthy fish populations and
fisheries that would result if our once productive ocean resources were
managed well.83
In New England, following passage of the SFA, the NEFMC and
NMFS continued to mismanage the groundfish fishery and failed to
implement the Act’s new requirements, problems that continue today.
Conservationists took NMFS back to federal court and won a 2001 decision
that resulted in a strong court order directing NMFS to end overfishing and
rebuild codfish and other depleted groundfish populations.84 However, the
resulting rebuilding plan implemented in 2004, Amendment 13, allowed
overfishing to continue for a number of years on five of the most overfished
populations of groundfish, including the severely depleted Georges Bank
cod stock; Amendment 13 survived judicial challenge by conservationists.85

79. See Shelley et al., supra note 25, at 225, 230–31.
80. Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions, supra note 58.
81. Sustainable Fisheries Act § 108(b), 110 Stat. at 3575.
82. See Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001); Am.
Oceans Campaign v. Daley, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2000).
83. For a detailed discussion of the New England fishery manager’s struggles to come
into compliance with the Magnuson-Stevens Act’s overfishing and rebuilding provisions,
see Fleming et al., supra note 25.
84. See Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 11; Conservation Law
Found. v. Evans, 211 F. Supp. 2d 55, 56 (D.D.C. 2002).
85. See Oceana v. Evans, 2005 WL 555416 at 13.
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The persistent mismanagement of the New England groundfish fishery
has left the cod teetering on the brink of ecological collapse.86 According
to the most recent scientific data published in 2005, scientists estimate that
the amount of Georges Bank cod has fallen to only ten percent of the
minimum amount needed to sustain sustainable and healthy population
levels.87 The population of Gulf of Maine cod stands at only twenty-three
percent of a healthy and sustainable level and it is no longer found in nearly
half its historic coastal spawning grounds of fifty to seventy years ago, due
to the possible extirpation of many small local populations.88 The main
factor in these declines is the years of rampant overfishing left unchecked
by New England’s fisheries managers.89 The fact that New England has
failed to enact any meaningful habitat protections is more difficult to
quantify but is without doubt a significant contributing factor to the
depletion of groundfish populations.90
Some scientists today question whether cod populations and the
fisheries they support can ever be brought back. Since the 1850s, the
Scotian Shelf cod population located in eastern Canada has plummeted
ninety-six percent, leading one recent scientific review to the interesting
conclusion that the current population is small enough to fit within the hulls

86. According to the 18th Report of the Northeast Regional Stock Assessment
Workshop, there are three characteristics of a collapse: (1) chronic low recruitment due to
reduced spawning biomass, (2) truncated age structure, and (3) prolonged periods of yields
less than about twenty-five percent of the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) value. See
NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, supra note 34, at 53. Others have defined collapse
as a greater than ninety percent decline in baseline abundance. See Boris Worm et al.,
Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Services, 314 SCIENCE 787, 788 (2006).
87. See 2005 GARM, supra note 3, at 2-4. For purposes of this article, the author’s
reference to “healthy and sustainable” refers to the biomass that would produce maximum
sustainable yield, the legal standard established in the Magnuson-Stevens Act as the floor
for defining optimum yield. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. Others would
consider this level to be depleted. See Worm et al., supra note 86, at 788 (defining a lower
biomass level as depleted).
88. Carl Safina et al., U.S. Ocean Fish Recovery: Staying the Course, 309 SCIENCE 707,
708 (July 29, 2005) (quoting E.P. Ames, 29 FISHERIES 10 (2004)). Scientists have also
suggested that fish populations have been so impacted that the average cod fish of today is
just one fifth of the size recorded in Indian middens and the logbooks of European fishers.
Jeremy Jackson, Colloquium: What Was Natural in the Coastal Oceans?, 98 PNAS 5411,
5414 (2001), available at http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/98/10/5411.
89. See 2005 GARM, supra note 3, at 2-4, -19, -156, -171 (showing that the mortality
rate has exceeded the overfishing threshold (Fmsy = 0.225) by at least three times in every
year for which the data has been presented).
90. See Worm et al., supra note 86, at 787.
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of sixteen small, pre-Civil War style schooners.91 Another recent scientific
study suggests that the commercial depletion of these cod stocks off the
coast of Nova Scotia may have irreversibly altered the ecosystem of the
Scotian Shelf to the point where the cod’s recovery is impossible.92 These
scientists argue that the decimation of the cod and other large groundfish
species has led to “cascade effects”: declines in top-predator abundance
which in turn allow populations that would otherwise serve as prey for
groundfish, such as herring, shrimp, crab, and lobster, to grow rapidly and
dominate the food web.93
The continued absence of cod on the Scotian Shelf demonstrates the
potential lasting impacts when ecosystems are restructured this way.
Although Canada placed a moratorium on cod fishing in most of its Eastern
fisheries in 1992, the cod has yet to recover and an estimated 40,000 jobs
have been lost.94 This shows the importance of biological and functional
diversity as a stabilizing force in ecosystems, as well as the need to manage
our fisheries responsibly to avoid catastrophe.95 The consequences of New
England’s failure to successfully deal with its depleted cod and other
groundfish populations are not only biological, as a full collapse would
trigger severe economic harm to many coastal communities. Fishing today
produces over a billion dollars in revenues for coastal communities in New
England.96 Even in the groundfish fishery’s current depleted condition,
groundfish revenues total approximately $80-100 million annually, before
considering additional economic impacts from fishing-related businesses
such as fish processing, fuel, supplies, and repairs.97 In Massachusetts in
2003, cod alone produced revenues of $27.5 million.98

91. Press Release, Census of Marine Life, First Ever Estimate of Cod Fishery in 1850’s
Reveals 96% Decline on Scotian Shelf (Mar. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.coml.org/medres/coml_release_hmap_public.pdf.
92. Kenneth T. Frank et al., Trophic Cascades in a Formerly Cod-Dominated Ecosystem,
308 SCIENCE 1621 (June 10, 2005); see also Tom Bell, Decline in Codfish Stocks may not
be Reversible, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, June 27, 2005, at A1.
93. Frank, supra note 92, at 1621-22.
94. D. H. Steele et al., The Managed Commercial Annihilation of Northern Cod, 8
NEWFOUNDLAND STUDIES 34, 35 (1992).
95. See Frank, supra note 92, at 1622; see also Worm et al., supra note 86, at 788, 790.
96. Press Release, National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, NMFS Northeast
Regional Office News: Commercial Fisheries Revenues for Northeast Coastal States Total
$1.032 Billion in 2003 (Oct. 21, 2004), available at
http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/press_release/2004/news04.15.htm.
97. THE FLEET VISIONING PROJECT, THE NORTHEAST GROUNDFISHERY: AN
I NTRODUCTION (2005), available at http://www.fleetvision.org/resourcesgroundfishery101.php (noting these are constant 1999 dollars).
98. See Press Release, supra note 96.
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These revenues, however, fall well short of what New England’s
legendary cod fishery would have produced today, and successful efforts to
rebuild cod and other groundfish stocks could revive the economy of New
England’s fisheries and fishing communities. Over the years, overfishing
has cost New England hundreds of millions of dollars: in 1992 prior to the
collapse of some of New England’s most important groundfish stocks,
overfishing was estimated to have cost Massachusetts at least $193 million
annually and all of New England $350 million and 14,000 jobs.99 Meanwhile, a recent independent economic analysis concluded that successfully
rebuilding groundfish fisheries in New England would result in a catch
value at approximately three times the current value.100 This is consistent
with the NEFMC’s own estimates that if groundfish stocks are rebuilt,
groundfish revenues will nearly triple within the next twenty years.101
Through its SFA habitat amendments, Congress addressed a fundamental biological principle in U.S. fisheries law that had not been
adequately recognized: fish, like all living creatures, need adequate habitat
to survive and reproduce.102 Seafloor habitats support much of the oceans’
productivity as ninety-eight percent of all known animal species live in or
on the sea floor, including about seventy-five percent of all commercially
landed fish species.103 Despite the SFA’s new habitat provisions and an
increasing body of scientific studies demonstrating that fishing gears such
as bottom trawls and scallop dredges can destroy fish habitat,104 the nation’s
99. 142 CONG. REC. S10812 (Sept. 18, 1996).
100. USSIF RASHID SUMAILA, FISH ECONOMICS: THE BENEFITS OF REBUILDING U.S.
O C E AN F ISH P OPULAT IONS 1 0 - 1 3 ( O ct . 2 0 0 5 ) , a va i l a b l e a t
http://www.e2.org/ext/doc/2005%20Fish%20Economics.pdf.
101. See FINAL AMENDMENT 13, supra note 1, at I-568 to I-569. The Environmental
Impact Statement reports that under the proposed rebuilding program, landings of large
mesh species like the GB cod would increase by about fifteen million pounds annually
between 2004 and 2008. Landings would continue to increase through the end of the
rebuilding period in 2026, reaching about 320 million pounds. Id.
102. See LOUGH, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
103. LANCE E. MORGAN & RATANA CHUENPAGDEE, SHIFTING GEARS: ADDRESSING THE
COLLATERAL IMPACTS OF FISHING METHODS IN U.S. WATERS 8 (2003), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdf/environment_pew_science_series_shift.pdf.
104. See Auster & Langton 1999, supra note 7, at 153-56; see also supra note 7 and
accompanying text. The habitat damage includes harm to living seafloor structures (e.g.
corals, sponges, seagrasses) as well as alterations to the geologic structures (e.g. boulders,
cobbles, gravel, sand, mud) that serve as nursery areas, refuges, and homes for fish and
organisms living in, on, or near the seafloor. See Chuenpagdee et al., supra note 5, at 517.
Other fishing gear, like gillnets, traps, and bottom longlines, can snag on seafloor structures
such as rocks, plants, and corals and cause damage. See Auster & Langton 1999, supra note
7, at 157. In most cases, areas with corals and hard bottoms with seafloor structures are the
most sensitive to damaging gear. See id. at 154-55.
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fishery management councils have made relatively little progress in
protecting essential fish habitat from the destructive impacts of fishing.
V. A NATIONAL HISTORY OF INADEQUATE HABITAT PROTECTION
Ten years after the passage of the Sustainable Fisheries Act in 1996,
protections for essential fish habitat from harmful fishing practices are, in
a word, “inadequate.” While council actions to protect EFH in recent years
are an improvement over past inaction, they still fall short of what is
required to protect our nation’s fish.
In response to the Magnuson-Stevens Act’s new habitat requirements,
fishery management councils matched the expansive definition of EFH by
identifying EFH within their regions broadly, however, councils took few
actions to protect it.105 Instead, councils deferred undertaking a detailed
fishing gear-effects analysis and any meaningful management and conservation measures to reduce the habitat impacts from fishing until some
undetermined second step to be taken after the 1998 statutory deadline.106
The councils claimed that there was no scientific evidence of negative
impacts to habitat from fishing gear.107 As a result, they did not undertake
full environmental impact statements under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), and instead issued environmental assessments that
concluded that reliance on existing management measures to protect
essential fish habitat was adequate.108 There was no practicability analysis
and alternatives for taking new actions to protect the sea floor from fishing
gear impacts were not considered.109
By 1999, only two of the existing thirty-eight FMPs nationwide
included any new actions designed to avoid or minimize the adverse effects
of fishing on EFH, and the actions that were taken affected only small
areas.110 While these plans were written by fishery management councils,
NMFS was complicit in this failure through its approval of the legally

105. Am. Oceans Campaign v. Daley, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 5-9. The court stated that “none
[of the councils] adopted measures that would restrict fishing gear . . . to minimize adverse
effects of fishing related activities on EFH.” Id. at 5.
106. Id. at 8-9.
107. Id. at 20.
108. Id. at 6-7, 13, 15-17.
109. Id. at 20-21.
110. MARINE FISH CONSERVATION NETWORK, LOST AT SEA – A REVIEW OF NATIONAL
MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES ACT 21
(1999).
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deficient fishery management plan amendments that were supposed to
implement the new essential fish habitat provisions.111
In response, conservation and fishing groups from around the country
brought suit in federal district court in 1999, challenging the work of the
councils and NMFS.112 In American Oceans Campaign v. Daley, the plaintiffs claimed that five of the eight regional fishery management councils
refused to regulate damaging fishing practices in violation of the SFA
amendments and violated NEPA by failing to undertake the appropriate
environmental analysis.113
The following year, in a decision with contradictory conclusions that
are difficult to fully comprehend, the court ruled against the groups on their
substantive Magnuson-Stevens Act claims.114 The court stated that “[p]laintiffs [were] correct that the [Magnuson-Stevens Act] prohibits the two-step
approach that [some of the councils] adopted.”115 Yet, in spite of this
holding regarding the meaning of the law, the court upheld the Agency’s
actions by deferring to the Agency’s protestations that it had “limited
scientific information” and already had protective measures in place.116
The court then went on to side with the plaintiffs on their NEPA claims,
holding that NMFS had violated the Act in approving five different
councils’ essential fish habitat amendments, because the environmental
assessments included “no substantive discussion of how fishing practices
and gear may damage corals, disrupt fish habitat, and destroy benthic life
that helps support healthy fish populations.”117 The court also found that
the environmental assessments “fail[ed] to consider all relevant and feasible
alternatives and fail[ed] to fully explain the environmental impact of the
proposed action and alternatives.”118

111. Id. NMFS disapproved only a few of the inadequate amendments, notably the
amendment from the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council. Id.
112. See Am. Oceans Campaign v. Daley, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 9. The plaintiffs’ NEPA
claim was that the NMFS violated the Act by performing limited, inadequate Environmental
Assessments for each of the Amendments, rather than full Environmental Impact Statements
(EIS). Id. See also National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. §
4332(C)(i-v) (2000) (requiring EIS for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment.”).
113. Am. Oceans Campaign v. Daley, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 9. The five councils were New
England, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean, Pacific, and North Pacific.
114. Id. at 15, 21.
115. Id. at 15 n.5.
116. Id. at 15-16.
117. Id. at 20.
118. Id.
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The American Oceans Campaign v. Daley decision is perplexing given
that the same set of egregious facts led the court to ultimately rule against
the plaintiffs on the substantive Magnuson-Stevens Act claims and for the
plaintiffs on the more procedural NEPA claims. This split decision,
however, also made the parties’ decisions regarding appeal difficult.119
Faced with undertaking comprehensive EFH environmental impact statements on all fisheries nationwide, NMFS and the plaintiffs reached a settlement agreement that established a compliance schedule for completing this
formidable task, and in so doing NMFS committed to thoroughly evaluate
the adverse effects of fishing on essential fish habitat and to regulate
damaging fishing practices as appropriate by the end of 2004.120
While the conservation plaintiffs in the American Oceans Campaign v.
Daley case lost on their substantive Magnuson-Stevens Act claims, without
NEPA’s requirements for full analysis it is unlikely that the NMFS or the
councils would have undertaken any measurable new efforts to protect
essential fish habitat. Now, ten years after passage of the SFA, the environmental impacts statements are, at least arguably, complete. “All councils
have described and identified EFH for their managed fisheries in a
precautionary fashion and have, or are in the process of, designating
HAPCs.”121
Where councils continue to fail is in taking meaningful action to avoid
or minimize the adverse impacts of fishing on EFH. Most councils have
proposed and adopted new measures for protecting EFH, however, the
measures offer only limited protection. While these actions represent

119. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (stating that in the absence of an “express determination”
of a final judgment as to one or more of the claims an “order or other form of decision . . .
which adjudicates fewer than all of the claims . . . shall not terminate the action as to any of
the claims or parties . . . .”). The United States Courts of Appeals “have jurisdiction of
appeals from . . . final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (2000).
120. See Joint Stipulation & Order at Attach. 1, Am. Oceans Campaign v. Evans 183 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001) (No. 99-982 GK) (Dec. 17, 2001) (setting forth the schedule for
EFH environmental impact statements). Later stipulations extended the timeline into 2005
for Atlantic herring and monkfish, and 2006 for Pacific groundfish. See Joint Stipulation
& Order as to Amend December 17, 2001 Joint Stipulation & Order As To Certain Fisheries
of the New England Fishery Management Region at 3-4, Am. Oceans Campaign v. Evans
183 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001) (No. 1:99CV00982 GK) (Dec. 23, 2003); and Defendants’
Unopposed Motion to Modify Amended Joint Stipulation & Order at 1, Am. Oceans
Campaign v. Evans 183 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001) (No. 1:99CV00982 GK) (Mar. 1,
2005); and Defendants’ Unopposed Motion to Modify Amended Joint Stipulation & Order
at 1, Am. Oceans Campaign v. Evans 183 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001) (No. 1:99CV00982
GK) (Feb. 22, 2006).
121. See MARINE FISH CONSERVATION NETWORK, supra note 10, at 6.
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progress when compared with past inaction, many councils “continue to use
several tactics to avoid enacting adequate EFH protections,”122 leaving
enormous gaps in protection that allow destructive fishing activities to
continue degrading important habitat throughout the nation.123
The tactics used by the councils include “hiding behind scientific
uncertainty,”124 “maintaining that existing management measures are
adequate,”125 prohibiting gear only where it is not a threat,126 and “providing
some protection for the most vulnerable habitat types but ignoring other
important areas.”127 Fishery managers often avoid taking action by requiring site specific or quantifiable information on the environmental impacts
of fishing practices and proposed solutions before taking action. In some
cases, they attack the scientific methods used to develop the scientific
information and scientific advice from their own scientific advisors.128 This
tactic flies in the face of scientific recommendations to take a precautionary
approach to management and delays necessary habitat protections.129
It is also common for managers to maintain that existing management
measures are sufficient to protect EFH, as was seen in the American Oceans
Campaign v. Daley case. While some measures adopted to minimize over-

122. Id. at 1.
123. Id. at 2, 5-6.
124. Id. at 1.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2.
127. MARINE FISH CONSERVATION NETWORK, supra note 10, at 2.
128. See infra notes 164 to 182 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., PEW OCEANS COMM’N, supra note 8, at 10, 90; see also U.S. COMM’N ON
OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 65-66, 80 (2004), available
at http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/full_color_rpt/000_ocean_full_report.pdf.
Under the precautionary approach, “[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing action
to prevent environmental degradation.” The U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
Principle 15, available at http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?
DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163; See also, Gary E. Marchant, From General Policy to
Legal Rule: Aspirations and Limitations of the Precautionary Principle, 111 ETHICS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 1799 (2003), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/
picrender.fcgi?artid=1241727&blobtype=pdf:
[T]he precautionary principle in just the past decade has been included in over a
dozen international environmental agreements, expressly incorporated into the legal
framework of the European Union, and adopted into the domestic laws of numerous
nations. By any measure, this is an impressive record of success, and one that
demonstrates that the precautionary principle is fulfilling a previously unmet need in
environmental policy.
Id.
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fishing, such as reducing fishing effort, can help protect habitat as well,
some councils have relied on these measures as a reason to neglect other
critical tools for protecting habitat such as closed areas and gear
modifications specifically designed for habitat protection. Fishing effort
reductions, for example, often succeed in only limiting the frequency with
which destructive gear passes through sensitive habitat, and it has been
demonstrated that habitat can take years to recover from a single pass of a
scallop dredge or otter trawl.130 Councils also often prohibit gear where it
is not a threat to existing fishing effort. While it is commendable when
councils take precautionary efforts to limit the footprint of damaging fishing
gear in sensitive habitats, these types of measures do little to protect EFH
currently impacted by fishing gear. More recently, councils have started to
protect some of the most vulnerable habitat types to meet their EFH
obligations, but then ignore other important habitats.131
VI. NEW ENGLAND’S HISTORY OF HABITAT PROTECTION UNDER THE
MAGNUSON-STEVENS ACT
Faced with the collapse of economically vital cod and other groundfish
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the New England Fishery Management
Council addressed the collapse with area closures and other measures
designed to reduce fishing mortality—but did not couple these efforts with
measures to protect fish habitat.
After passage of the SFA, New England, like other councils around the
country, designated an EFH in 1998.132 At this time, the NEFMC identified
a small area on the northeastern corner of Georges Bank known to contain

130. These sensitive areas are home to emergent epifauna, which provide essential habitat
for juvenile groundfish, especially Atlantic cod. See Collie et al., 2000a, supra note 7, at
989. The recovery rate depends on both the type of habitat and the species present, and can
range from several months to fifteen years. See Collie et al., 2000b, supra note 7, at 795.
131. Recent protections for essential fish habitat reflect growing scientific recognition of
the importance of coral reefs, deepwater corals, and hard bottom surfaces; however other
habitat types, such as gravel bottoms and mud, are sensitive as well and offer important
habitats to a variety of managed species, but receive little or no protection. The South
Atlantic Council is the primary exception to these trends. That fishery management council
has adopted EFH protections in all of its managed fisheries, demonstrating that the SFA’s
EFH provisions have the potential to work. See MARINE FISH CONSERVATION NETWORK,
supra note 10, at 2.
132. NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, FINAL AMENDMENT 11 TO THE
NORTHEAST MULTISPECIES FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR ESSENTIAL FISH HABITAT
INCORPORATING THE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (Oct. 7, 1998), available at
http://www.nefmc.org/nemulti/index.html (follow “Plan Amendment” hyperlink; then
follow “11” hyperlink) [hereinafter FINAL AMENDMENT 11].
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habitat suitable for juvenile cod as an HAPC.133 This area was already
closed to fishing as part of the earlier efforts to reduce fishing mortality on
groundfish; thus, this action provided no additional habitat protection.134
The Council also identified an Atlantic salmon HAPC located in eleven of
eastern Maine’s rivers containing the last remaining U.S. populations of
Atlantic salmon, which were under consideration for listing as an endangered species.135 This designation was also easy for the Council to make as
no federally managed commercial fishing occurs in these rivers.136 The
Council went on to conclude that no new actions to protect EFH were
necessary because measures already in place to control fishing mortality and
future actions in emerging fisheries would also minimize impacts to EFH.137
The measures already in place or under consideration were not designed to
protect EFH, however, and many have been subsequently modified,
eliminated, or never took effect.
As a result of American Oceans Campaign v. Daley, New England
fisheries managers were provided with a 2004 deadline to meet the SFA’s
EFH requirements.138 In response, the NEFMC identified Amendment 13,
the same amendment designated in response to another court order to
establish New England’s first comprehensive rebuilding plan for overfished
groundfish populations, as the lead vehicle of the Council’s efforts to finally
comply with the SFA’s EFH provisions.139 Unfortunately, the habitat

133. Id. at 40-42.
134. Id. at xiv.
135. Id. at 41, 43.
136. Only state-managed commercial fisheries, notably Maine’s lobster fishery, have the
potential to occur in some of these areas.
137. See FINAL AMENDMENT 11, supra note 132, at xiv, 235; see also Am. Oceans
Campaign v. Daley, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 7 (noting that the Amendment’s conclusion stated
that existing and recently proposed measures met the standards of the SFA).
138. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
139. See FINAL AMENDMENT 13, supra note 1, at I-v. The Council at this time also sought
to meet the terms of the American Oceans Campaign v. Daley settlement in other
management plan amendments under development including in the Atlantic sea scallop and
Atlantic monkfish fisheries. See NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, FINAL
AMENDMENT 10 TO THE ATLANTIC SEA SCALLOP FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN WITH A
FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, REGULATORY IMPACT
REVIEW, AND REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS (Dec. 2003), available at
http://www.nefmc.org/scallops/index.html (follow “Other Information” hyperlink; then
follow “Final Amendment 10” hyperlink) [hereinafter FINAL AMENDMENT 10]; NEW
ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, MID-ATLANTIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT
COUNCIL & NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, AMENDMENT 2 TO THE MONKFISH
FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN INCLUDING A FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, REGULATORY IMPACT REVIEW, AND STOCK ASSESSMENT AND FISHERY
EVALUATION REPORT FOR THE 2002 FISHING YEAR (Dec. 2004), available at
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measures eventually contained in Amendment 13 turned out to be weak.
As part of Amendment 13, the NEFMC did undertake a detailed geareffects evaluation and practicability analysis. The Council, however,
ultimately continued its pattern of relying on the same measures
implemented to reduce fishing effort as the measures it relied upon to
satisfy the EFH requirement to minimize habitat impacts to the extent
practicable.140 The NEFMC’s logic was that anything that reduces the
amount of fishing reduces the frequency of bottom disturbance associated
with gear and, therefore, constitutes habitat protection.141 This contradicts
scientists’ findings, however, that reducing fishing effort alone is not
sufficient and should be used in combination with other measures such as
modifying gear that damages seafloor habitat or closing an adequate
number of areas to damaging fishing practices.142
Over the years, the NEFMC had reopened portions of the mortality
closures to harmful scallop dredges despite acknowledging that “[y]earround closed areas that are fished periodically or seasonally by bottom
tending mobile gear . . . offer significantly less protection for habitat than
those that are not fished by mobile bottom gear.”143 In Amendment 13, the
NEFMC re-drew some of the boundaries of the existing mortality closures,
ostensibly to better protect critical habitats, and designated specific portions
of these updated closed areas as indefinite “habitat closures.”144 While these

http://www.nefmc.org/monk/index.html (follow “Plan Amendments” hyperlink; then follow
“2” hyperlink) [hereinafter AMENDMENT 2]. To the extent habitat measures taken in these
plan amendments were inconsistent with Amendment 13, they were later reconciled so they
were consistent with the Amendment 13 measures. See NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, FRAMEWORK ADJUSTMENT 16 TO THE ATLANTIC SEA SCALLOP FMP AND
FRAMEWORK ADJUSTMENT 39 TO THE NORTHEAST MULTISPECIES FMP WITH AN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, REGULATORY IMPACT REVIEW, AND REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
ANALYSIS 1-1 (July 2004), available at http://www.nefmc.org/scallops/index.html (follow
“Other Information” hyperlink; then follow “Framework 16 to the Scallop Fishery
Management Plan” hyperlink) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK ADJUSTMENT 16].
140. FINAL AMENDMENT 13, supra note 1, at I-92 to I-93.
141. See id. at I-xi, I-491.
142. NORTHEAST REGION ESSENTIAL FISH HABITAT STEERING COMMITTEE, WORKSHOP
ON THE EFFECTS OF FISHING GEAR ON MARINE HABITATS OFF THE NORTHEASTERN UNITED
STATES 44-45 (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/nefsc/publications/crd/
crd0201/crd02-01.pdf.
143. See FINAL AMENDMENT 13, supra note 1, at I-461. The Council provided for
temporary closures of some additional areas to scallop dredges as part of a rotational
management system designed to promote scallop growth. However, many of these areas
remained open to bottom trawling, and the Council ultimately scaled back the areas
indefinitely closed to scallop dredges to mimic existing groundfish closed areas.
FRAMEWORK ADJUSTMENT 16, supra note 139, at 4-3 to 4-4.
144. See FINAL AMENDMENT 13, supra note 1, at I-x, I-93 to I-95.
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represent the first specified habitat closures in New England fishery
management history, because they are smaller than the previously closed
areas, it is difficult to argue there was a significant net benefit to habitat.
Moreover, in establishing the habitat closures, the Council relied almost
exclusively on the boundaries of the previously established mortality
closures, not habitat science, with only small adjustments to account for
important habitat.145 While a step in the right direction, even with the
inclusion of the previously identified juvenile cod HAPC in the habitat
closures, about eighty-five percent of the critically important juvenile cod
EFH is left unprotected outside the closed areas in vulnerable gravel and
hard bottom habitat open year–round to trawling and dredging.146 Combined, these habitat closures protect only about six percent of the EFH for
federally managed species in the Council’s jurisdiction that is moderately
or highly vulnerable to the effects of bottom gear.147
To its credit, the NEFMC took some proactive steps to protect habitat
in its most recent amendment to its monkfish fishery management plan.148
Responding to calls to conserve important deep-sea coral communities, the
NEFMC took the lead in closing two deepwater canyons known as Oceanographer and Lydonia canyons, located on the southern edge of Georges
Bank in southern New England, to bottom trawls and bottom gillnets used
by monkfish fishermen.149 Using authority provided by the MagnusonStevens Act to manage species throughout their range, the Council also
placed size restrictions on some types of trawl gear used in all Mid-Atlantic
canyons and several other areas of the continental shelf in order to prevent
monkfish vessels from damaging other vulnerable habitat.150 Similar to
many previous NEFMC habitat actions, the two canyons that were closed
were not yet being fished for any species, making the NEFMC’s decision
easier. Nonetheless, the closure should be viewed as a precautionary step
to protect the canyons against potential expansion of the fishery.
In the end, when the NEFMC had the opportunity through its groundfish rebuilding plan and subsequent actions in other fisheries to take a
significant step forward in protecting the habitat essential to the survival of

145. See id. at I-93 to I-97.
146. See id. at I-93, I-502 (showing the selection of habitat alternative 10 option (b) and
that the total juvenile cod EFH protected is 15.3 percent).
147. See id. at I-93, I-503 (showing that the sum of the vulnerable EFH protected for all
species protected by this alternative is 5.9 percent).
148. The New England Council manages this species in conjunction with the Mid-Atlantic
Council, but it has lead responsibility in these efforts.
149. See AMENDMENT 2, supra note 139, at 41.
150. Id. at 38-39.
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juvenile groundfish, it deferred taking a more rigorous look at EFH
protection until Amendment 14 to the Northeast Multispecies FMP is
completed. Amendment 14, which is part of an “EFH Omnibus Amendment,” is intended to address habitat in all New England fisheries simultaneously.151 Unfortunately, this amendment is not scheduled for completion until 2008.152 Meanwhile, New England’s legendary cod populations
remain on the brink of collapse and are showing few signs of improvement.153 The precautionary, proactive approach to habitat protection taken
in the monkfish management plan, though tactically a relatively easy
decision to make due to the lack of fishing in the area, is a positive step for
the New England Council. This proactive spirit for habitat protection needs
to be fully embraced in the years ahead and applied under more difficult and
controversial circumstances as we seek to restore and sustain New
England’s depleted fisheries.
VII. IS NEW ENGLAND READY TO TAKE MEANINGFUL
HABITAT PROTECTIONS?
After several years of failure to enact meaningful habitat protections in
New England, as part of the EFH Omnibus Habitat Amendment the
NEFMC is exploring a broader range of options for habitat protection as
part of the Magnuson-Stevens Act’s five year EFH review.154 The amendment is designed to reexamine New England’s EFH and HAPC designations
and the Council will consider additional measures for minimizing the
impacts of fishing on EFH.155

151. See FINAL AMENDMENT 13, supra note 1, at I-13 to I-14. This “omnibus” amendment process emerged in part from the terms of the consent decree negotiated between
NOAA Fisheries and the conservation plaintiffs in American Oceans Campaign v. Daley.
152. See LESLIE-ANN MCGEE, PROJECT MANAGER, NEFMC, EFH OMNIBUS AMENDMENT
#2 TIMELINE (Nov. 1, 2006), available at http://www.nefmc.org/habitat/index.html (follow
“Habitat and MPAs” hyperlink; then follow “November 14-16, 2006 Council Meeting
Materials” hyperlink; then follow “Omnibus Amendment Timeline” hyperlink).
153. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
154. Although the EFH Omnibus Amendment was initiated prior to the filing of certain
challenges to the habitat provisions contained in the most recent amendments to the groundfish and scallop and groundfish fishery management plans, the Council’s response was no
doubt colored in part by the pressure applied as a result of those challenges by one of the
parties to the American Oceans Campaign v. Daley litigation. See generally Oceana v.
Evans, 2005 WL 555416 (D.D.C. 2005); Oceana v. Evans, 384 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C.
2005).
155. See NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, ESSENTIAL FISH HABITAT
OMNIBUS AMENDMENT APPROVED GOALS AND OBJECTIVES (July 2004) (on file with
author).
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A. New England’s Search for HAPCs
The conservation community vigorously seized upon the first opportunity for substantive public participation in the EFH Omnibus Habitat
Amendment, a request for proposed new HAPCs. Recognizing criticism
that the original broad EFH designations did little to focus attention on the
most important or vulnerable habitat, and that subsequent efforts by
fisheries regulators at habitat protection in New England had largely failed,
the opportunity to participate in a structured public process designed to
identify HAPCs provided hope that the NEFMC would take action to
protect important habitat. Designation of HAPCs is intended to identify
those areas within EFH that should receive heightened attention by fisheries
regulators when establishing higher standards and levels of habitat
protection. The HAPC regulations provide that HAPCs meet at least one
of four criteria in order to be designated an HAPC, namely: “(i) the
importance of the ecological function provided by the habitat; (ii) the extent
to which the habitat is sensitive to human-induced environmental degradation; (iii) whether, and to what extent, development activities are, or will be,
stressing the habitat type; and (iv) the rarity of the habitat type.”156
In December 2004, the NEFMC invited the public to submit candidate
HAPC proposals for each of its fishery management plans.157 In doing so,
the Council identified a set of preferences for submissions and encouraged
completed HAPC proposals in order to increase its ability to respond in a
rapid and equitable fashion. The identified preferences were for proposals
that: would improve fisheries management in the EEZ; include EFH
designations for more than one council-managed species in order to
maximize the benefit of the designations; include juvenile cod EFH; and
meet more than one of the EFH HAPC criteria.158 Sadly, and yet without
doubt reflecting the longstanding resistance to conservation by New
England fishermen, in response to the request for proposals not a single
proposal came from a fishermen or fishing organization, while eight
proposals were received from environmental organizations and one was
received from two leading habitat scientists.159

156. 50 C.F.R. § 600.815(a)(8) (2005).
157. See Press Release, New England Fishery Management Council, NEFMC Requests
for Candidate Proposals for HAPCs (Dec. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.nefmc.org/press/press_releases_hapcs_press_release.pdf.
158. Id.
159. See NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, JOINT HABITAT PDT AND
ADVISORY PANEL, MEETING SUMMARY (Apr. 13, 2005), available at http://www.nefmc.org/
habitat/meetsum/habitat_adv_050413.pdf. The proposals received were identified as
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B. Proposing a Multi-species Approach to Habitat Protection
The Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) and World Wildlife FundCanada (together CLF), proposed a comprehensive and innovative new
strategy for habitat protection in furtherance of the groups’ efforts to restore
depleted cod and other groundfish populations in the Northwest Atlantic
Ocean.160 The “Multi-species HAPC” proposal met the stated preferences
and was designed to recognize as HAPCs, areas of the ocean identified as
necessary for the survival of juvenile fish for eight overfished species of
groundfish, including cod.161 In introducing their proposal, CLF argued that
the appropriate stewardship of areas used by these species is expected to be
important to the long-term productivity of their populations and the
fisheries they support.162 The analysis focuses on juvenile fish because
juveniles are at high risk of predation and dependent upon the sheltering
features of bottom habitats that are particularly vulnerable to degradation.163
Additionally, juveniles are essential to rebuilding plans and sustainable
fisheries, yet are not commercially valuable until grown. CLF proposed a
multi-species approach because the productivity of overfished populations
can be most efficiently benefited by identifying habitat areas that
simultaneously support multiple species, and multi-species approaches are
fundamental to ecosystem–based management.164
follows: 1. The New England Seamounts HAPC, Proposers: Peter Auster, National Undersea
Research Center and Department of Marine Sciences, University of Connecticut at Avery
Point and Les Watling, Darling Marine Center, University of Maine; 2. Cashes Ledge
HAPC, Proposer: Geoff Smith, The Ocean Conservancy; 3. Georges Bank Northern Edge
HAPC, Proposer: Geoff Smith, The Ocean Conservancy; 4. Jeffreys Ledge/Stellwagen Bank
HAPC, Proposer: Geoff Smith, The Ocean Conservancy; 5. Coral-Rich Deep-Sea Canyons
HAPC, Proposers: Jacob Kritzer and Doug Rader, Environmental Defense; 6. A MultiSpecies Approach for Juveniles of Eight Over-Fished Species HAPC, Proposers: Jud
Crawford and Roger Fleming, Conservation Law Foundation; 7. Juvenile Cod HAPCs on
Georges Bank, Proposer: Christopher J. Zeman, Oceana; 8. Deep-Sea Coral Habitat HAPC,
Proposer: Christopher J. Zeman, Oceana; 9. New England Seamounts and Deep-Sea Corals
HAPC, Proposers: Valerie Suzdak and Eric Bilsky, Oceana. The NEFMC had also
previously approved consideration of an inshore Gulf of Maine cod HAPC proposal as part
of the original EFH Omnibus Amendment in 1999. This proposal covers an area tightly
drawn along the coast and, similar to the Eastern Georges Bank and Atlantic salmon HAPCs,
includes areas not commercially fished. Id.
160. See CRAWFORD & FLEMING, supra note 12.
161. Id. at 2.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2-3 (citing Auster & Langton, 1999; Auster et al., 1996; Collie et al., 1997;
Collie et al., 2000a).
164. See CRAWFORD & FLEMING, supra note 12, at 2.
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The groups proposed a network of HAPCs based on locations where
large concentrations of young fish from eight struggling, overfished species,
such as Atlantic cod, hake, and yellowtail flounder live.165 With the aid of
a powerful computer modeling tool (MARXAN), the groups generated a
unique, objective, and science-based proposal for the NEFMC to consider,
which sought to restore and protect areas that provide critical habitat for
many species at the same time.166 The proposal identified a set of areas
within each of three biogeographic regions that included habitat for each of
the species. The identified habitat areas were based on abundance data
revealed by thirty-three years of NMFS research surveys within the
Southern New England, Georges Bank, and the Gulf of Maine regions using
a standard ten-minute square grid system for each of the regions.167 The
proposal included sets of candidate HAPCs, one set per region, which were
designed to meet multi-species habitat conservation objectives. The habitat
protection goals of the proposed networks were modest, with the most
precautionary network alternative targeted to protect habitat for about
twenty percent of the juveniles of each species in each biogeographic area,
which, due to the efficiency gained by simultaneously identifying habitat
that supported more than one species through the use of the MARXAN tool,
resulted in approximately only nine percent of the total habitat in each area
proposed as an HAPC.168
With this approach, CLF sought to minimize the number of isolated
habitat sites by efficiently designating HAPCs that conserve EFH important
to large numbers of juvenile fish while minimizing the impacts to fishermen.169 CLF recommended that, in view of the scientific evidence demonstrating the vulnerability of ocean floor juvenile fish habitats to degradation
by gear such as trawls and dredges, appropriate action to maintain the
integrity of the identified areas should be taken to help ensure the recovery
and long-term productivity of overfished groundfish populations.170
The Multi-species HAPC proposal offered a compelling opportunity for
the NEFMC to take a significant step forward in restoring the health of the

165. Id. at 3 (citing Peter J. Auster et al., Fish Species and Community Distributions as
Proxies for Seafloor Habitat Distributions: The Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary
Example (Northwest Atlantic, Gulf of Maine) 60 ENVIRONMENTAL BIOLOGY OF FISHES 34042 (2001); Rosamonde R. Cook & Peter J. Auster, Use of Simulated Annealing for
Identifying Essential Fish Habitat in a Multi-species Context 19 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
876-886 (2005)).
166. Id. at 3.
167. Id. at 1, 6.
168. See CRAWFORD & FLEMING, supra note 12, at 7.
169. Id. at 3.
170. Id. at 27.
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region’s fisheries. The approach was objective, science based, and it sought
to accomplish significant levels of protection for several vulnerable fish
stocks while minimizing the impacts to fishing through an efficient design.
C. New England Council: Still Hiding Behind Scientific Uncertainty
When presented with the Multi-species HAPC Network proposal, the
NEFMC fell back upon one of its traditional tactics for failing to act to
protect habitat—its perception of scientific uncertainty surrounding the
methodology used to develop the proposal. Evaluation of the proposed
HAPCs was initially conducted by the NEFMC’s Habitat Plan Development
Team (Habitat PDT) with the advice of their habitat advisory panel. The
advisory panel consisted mostly of commercial and recreational fishermen
and representatives from state fishery agencies. Those environmental
groups and scientists who proposed HAPCs were invited to present and
discuss their proposals at the initial HAPC evaluation meeting that included
as participants the Habitat PDT and habitat advisory panel; however, there
were few additional opportunities for public participation and no public
hearings on the proposals.171
At the initial HAPC evaluation meeting, the Multi-species HAPC
proposal was enthusiastically supported by several members of the Habitat
PDT, including the two leading independent marine habitat scientists who
were present.172 While industry advisors and some state fisheries agency
representatives asked questions at this meeting, only relatively minor
recommendations were made for clarifying or improving the proposal.173
The Multi-species HAPC proposal, however, soon came under attack
from industry and state fishery agency representatives who saw the proposal
as a threat to the economic interests of the fishing industry. They argued
that if approved, it would lead to new habitat closures that “would impact
nearly all fisheries . . . [and] retard the Council’s progress toward achieving
Optimum Yield in the healthy stocks.”174 The latter point was a rather
remarkable concern given that the NEFMC’s existing management

171. See NEFMC MEETING SUMMARY AUG. 2005, infra note 184.
172. See, e.g., Letter from Roger Fleming and John Crawford, Conservation Law
Foundation, to Habitat Committee Members and Staff, New England Fishery Management
Council (Aug. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Letter from Fleming and Crawford] (with enclosure
containing Habitat PDT, Evaluation of Groundfish Species HAPC Proposal (undated)
[hereinafter Habitat PDT Evaluation]) (on file with author).
173. See NEFMC MEETING SUMMARY AUG. 2005, infra note 184, at 7-8.
174. Letter from James O’Malley, Executive Director, East Coast Fisheries Federation,
Inc. to Frank Blount, Chairman, NEFMC 2 (May 25, 2005) (on file with author).
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approach had resulted in a fishery where none of New England’s nineteen
managed groundfish stocks were being managed at its biomass target,
thirteen stocks were considered overfished, and overfishing was still
occurring on eight stocks.175
The revised HAPC proposals were formally evaluated and scored at a
second meeting of the Habitat PDT only, where a detailed discussion was
led by pairs of PDT members who had been assigned to evaluate each
proposal. These reviewers were also charged with writing detailed evaluations that were to be later revised to reflect the Habitat PDT discussion and
presented to the NEFMC Habitat Committee for their consideration and
recommendation for, or against, further development. The review team that
led the evaluation of the Multi-species HAPC proposal did not include any
of the independent expert habitat scientists on the Habitat PDT, but instead
consisted of a NMFS resource economist and a NMFS marine habitat
resource specialist.176 During the Habitat PDT discussion, the proposal
continued to be supported by many members of the Habitat PDT, including
all three of its leading habitat scientists.177 However, the discussion, and to
an even greater extent the written evaluation later prepared for the NEFMC
Habitat Committee, took a surprising turn away from the support and
enthusiastic response that the proposal received during the first review
meeting. The discussion and evaluation focused on several criticisms
consistent with the issues raised during the intervening time between
meetings by fishing industry representatives.178 While the Habitat PDT
meeting was open to the public, it was considered a working Habitat PDT
meeting; thus, there was no opportunity for public participation and there
were no additional opportunities to respond to the Habitat PDT discussion
or the reviewer’s written evaluations until the actual Habitat Committee
meeting the following month where the proposals were considered and
voted on.179
The Habitat PDT’s written evaluation of the Multi-species HAPC
proposal presented to the NEFMC’s Habitat Committee tracked industry
criticism of the use of abundance (“prescience/absence”) data and the

175. See 2005 GARM, supra note 3, at vi to viii.
176. The reviewers were Steve Edwards, National Marine Fisheries Service, and David
Stevenson, National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration.
177. These three scientists included Mr. Auster, Mr. Collie, and Page Valentine, who was
absent from the initial meeting. All three are internationally known for their scientific work
related to marine habitat. See, e.g., supra notes 6 and 7.
178. Habitat PDT Evaluation, supra note 172.
179. See E-mails (2) from Leslie-Ann McGee, Associate Director, NEFMC, to Roger
Fleming, Senior Attorney, Conservation Law Foundation (July 12, 2005) (on file with
author).
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MARXAN model for identifying habitat.180 Specifically, it elevated the
scientifically groundless arguments made by some PDT members that
juvenile fish abundance cannot be used to identify important fish habitat
over the opinions of the leading habitat scientists, which was supported with
uncontradicted scientific literature, favoring the use of abundance data and
the MARXAN tool to identify important habitat.181 The written evaluation
failed to even acknowledge that the leading habitat scientists on the Habitat
PDT argued strongly in support of the proposal and its methodology.182 It
also appeared to travel out of its way to attempt to sharply criticize the
proposal wherever possible, including a passage that criticized the
suggestion, based on NMFS’s own recent economic analysis, that rebuilt
groundfish populations could result in increased economic benefits for
fishermen.183
With this written evaluation provided as background, it is not surprising
that the prospects for the Multi-species HAPC proposal did not improve
when it was presented to the NEFMC’s Habitat Committee. After a brief
introduction of the proposal by staff, the commercial fisherman sitting as
vice chair to the Committee simply stated the Multi-species HAPC proposal
should not go forward because the use of relative abundance data as a proxy

180. Compare O’Malley, supra note 174, at 2, with Habitat PDT Evaluation, supra note
172, at 2-3.
181. See CRAWFORD & FLEMING, supra note 12, at 3.
182. See Letter from Fleming and Crawford, supra note 172.
183. Compare Habitat PDT Evaluation, supra note 172, at 4, with CRAWFORD & FLEMING,
supra note 12, at 27. There were a variety of additional criticisms reflected in the PDT
evaluation including that the proposal did not address certain EFH criteria and that it did not
provide enough information on specific seascape and water column characteristics. As was
later pointed out this was simply not true. The evaluation also contained embarrassing
contradictions. For example, on the one hand there was criticism for not addressing current
and historical ecological issues, but later the proposal was derided for comments addressing
ecological benefits. In fact, in deriding CLF for referring to ecological benefits, it was
asserted that this revealed the real underlying intent of the proposal to create broader marine
protected areas. Unfortunately for the evaluation duo, the proposal was in fact merely using
the precise terminology of the EFH rule and used a relatively narrow juvenile fish data set,
much narrower than what would be required for a true marine protected area proposal. This
point was made by Mr. Auster during the Habitat PDT discussion but the criticism remained
in the written evaluation later presented to the Habitat Committee. Finally, the proposal was
criticized for incorporating policy judgments such as weighting the solution toward already
existing closed areas, yet this was specifically requested by the Habitat PDT at the first
review meeting. The written evaluation did not accurately reflect the discussion of the larger
PDT, and failed to reflect the will of the full Habitat PDT that it be forwarded to the Habitat
Committee with a neutral recommendation for consideration with certain additional areaspecific information on the habitat characteristics and evaluation criteria. This additional
work was never completed. See Letter from Fleming and Crawford, supra note 172.
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for habitat was inappropriate, and he made a motion to eliminate the
proposal from further consideration.184 This view again ignored the uncontradicted scientific literature to the contrary and the Habitat Committee
staff’s direct caution against condemning the use of this data as a proxy for
habitat because that is the basis for all of New England’s existing EFH
designations—a method that met with peer review approval.185 The NMFS
EFH staff on hand, however, chimed in with vague and unsupported
comments discounting the value of using abundance data and the
MARXAN model for meeting EFH requirements, and the Committee
passed the vice chair’s motion ending consideration of the Multi-species
HAPC proposal.186
The Multi-species HAPC proposal presented an approach to identifying
important habitat areas that was different than what had previously been
taken by the Council when considering HAPCs or other habitat areas for
protection. The proposal reflected an approach that relied upon the best
available science.187 The proposal was also different from all other
proposals both in terms of methodology and the resulting HAPCs proposed,
and given its sound basis in science, for that reason alone merited
consideration as an alternative in the NEFMC’s EFH Omnibus Amendment
in order to meet NEPA requirements. This would have provided the
opportunity to address any legitimate, perceived weaknesses through the
development of additional information and analysis, much as was done with
other proposed HAPCs.188 To the fishing industry representatives and
Habitat PDT and NEFMC Habitat Committee members who did not support
full consideration of the proposal, the way the Multi-species HAPC
proposal was most different from other proposals was that it proposed
protecting significant areas of habitat currently fished in all three of the

184. NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, MEETING SUMMARY, JOINT
HABITAT PDT AND HABITAT ADVISORS MEETING 8 (Aug. 22, 2005), available at
http://www.nefmc.org/habitat/meetsum/habitat_aug05.pdf [hereinafter NEFMC MEETING
SUMMARY AUG. 2005].
185. Id.
186. Id. (citing comments of Mr. Lou Chiarella, NMFS, stating “that HAPC designation
implies a level of knowledge above and beyond what we have on average,” and that he “was
not sure MARXAN can provide that additional knowledge that an HAPC requires.”) Id.
187. National Standard 2 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act requires that conservation and
management measures be based on the best available scientific information available. 16
U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2) (2000).
188. For example, the Council recently approved a juvenile cod HAPC proposal for
Georges Bank that was significantly reconfigured from the original proposal based on
additional data gathered by the Habitat PDT. See Memorandum from Leslie-Ann McGee,
PDT Chair to Habitat/MPA Committee re: the Development of a Great South Channel
Habitat Area of Particular Concern (Nov. 1, 2006) (on file with author).
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biogeographic regions managed by the Council. Thus, the NEFMC again
allowed the perception of short-term economic costs to trump a sciencebased management approach designed to help restore a sustainable and
long-term economically valuable groundfish fishery.
Based upon the experience with the HAPC process, it does not appear
that the NEFMC and NMFS are prepared to undertake a meaningful,
scientifically objective approach to habitat protection in New England.
When called upon to consider the objective, science-based approach taken
in the Multi-species HAPC proposal, the NEFMC with the support of
NMFS elected not to give it full consideration. This response was disappointing, though perhaps not surprising given the NEFMC’s historic
resistance to protecting habitat and to taking a long-term view to management. In the end, industry fears about the implications of the proposal were
most influential, and in the face of uncontradicted scientific evidence
supporting the approach taken in the proposal, the NEFMC and NMFS
questioned the scientific approach and used this alleged uncertainty as an
excuse not to further consider the proposal. Instead, the NEFMC accepted
for further consideration other proposals that contained little or no areas
currently fished and that were smaller, independent areas.
On the other hand, as development of the Omnibus EFH Amendment
has continued to unfold several of those independent HAPC alternatives do
remain under consideration, and some of them have the potential to protect
at least some habitat that is vulnerable and currently fished. The possibility
remains that from these proposals, a less ambitious network of HAPCs will
emerge, even if they were identified on an ad hoc rather than scientifically
objective basis.189 Further, the Habitat Committee agreed that use of the
MARXAN tool should be considered for the second phase of the EFH
Omnibus Amendment when measures designed to minimize adverse
impacts to habitat, including habitat identified as HAPC’s, are identified.190
Thus, while the NEFMC’s response to the Multi-species HAPC Proposal
supports arguments for reform of the nation’s fishery management councils
and the nation’s approach to fisheries management, several on-the-water
improvements to habitat protection in New England may yet be achieved.
Still, influential segments of New England’s fishing industry have been
dogging the HAPC process since its inception and the stiffest battles for
designation and protection of some of New England’s most important
habitat are yet to come.

189. Some of the same areas that have been identified on an ad hoc basis were also
identified through the modeling done for the Multi-species HAPC proposal.
190. Habitat PDT Evaluation, supra note 172, at 5.
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VIII. LOOKING AHEAD: CAN WE COUNT ON THE MAGNUSON-STEVENS
ACT FOR HABITAT PROTECTION OR SHOULD WE LOOK ELSEWHERE?
The demise of the New England groundfish fishery and the continuing
destruction of sensitive marine habitats that support the Gulf of Maine
region’s commercially valuable marine fish populations illustrate the
challenge of preserving marine ecosystems. Even with a growing body of
scientific evidence in hand demonstrating the value of marine habitat to
ensuring the recovery and long-term sustainability of fish populations and
the destructive impacts of fishing gear to that habitat, the NEFMC has been
slow to develop and enact the habitat protections necessary to lay the
ecological foundation necessary for fish stock recovery. This failure to act
is more bewildering when viewed together with economic analyses showing
the potential benefits that would accrue to fishermen and fishing communities from a rebuilt groundfish fishery. Thus, while some progress has
been made in New England toward restoring our severely depleted stocks
of cod and other groundfish through management measures designed to
reduce fishing mortality, significant changes in fisheries management are
clearly still necessary if we are to ever again enjoy the benefits of a healthy
and highly productive ocean ecosystem off New England’s coast.
A. Reason for Hope in New England
There are reasons to hope for recovery of New England’s fabled
groundfish fishery. Though today it is highly altered by centuries of
exploitation, the ocean ecosystem of the Gulf of Maine region remains one
of the most productive in the world. So productive in fact that we may be
justified in stating that if ever there was an ecosystem that could recover
from the brink of collapse, it is here.191
Despite continued overfishing on several groundfish stocks, we have
witnessed steady mortality rate decreases on the majority of stocks.192
There have also been some limited gains in habitat protection, primarily
reflected by the first habitat closures for the region implemented through the
recent groundfish and scallop fishery management plan amendments, and
the canyon closures implemented as part of the recent monkfish plan
amendment. We have witnessed signs of rebuilding on a few groundfish
populations: fisheries scientists from the Northeast Fisheries Science Center
now believe that there is evidence suggesting that the year classes of cod

191. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
192. See 2005 GARM, supra note 3, at vi.
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born in 2003 and 2004 may be the strongest in over ten years.193 The 2003
year class for haddock on Georges Bank appears to be one of the greatest
on record.194
Perhaps most promising are some of the recent changes in the makeup
and actions of the NEFMC, although to date the significant actions fall
outside the realm of habitat protection. This is best symbolized by the
September 2006 election for Council Chairman, won by a representative
from the Cape Cod Commercial Hook Fishermen’s Association, an
organization of fishermen on record as supporting conservation and reform
of federal fisheries law.195 In addition, Amendment 13 established New
England’s first groundfish rebuilding plan, and with it the increased use of
enforceable catch limits in the region.196 Subsequently, the Council took
action in response to the most recent scientific report on groundfish stock
status and acted, without a court order, to reduce fishing mortality back in
line with the Amendment 13 rebuilding plan.197 Within the past year, the
Council has acted twice in its Atlantic herring fishery management plan to
protect the forage base for the groundfish fishery and larger ecosystem
through precautionary gear restrictions in important inshore spawning areas
and a reduction in the inshore total allowable catch of herring.198 More

193. See Id. at vi, 2-2, 2-5, 2-157.
194. Id. at 2-33.
195. See Press Release, Hook Fisherman Elected Chair of the New England Fishery
Management Council (Sept. 26, 2006), available at http://www.ccchfa.org/pages/media_
center/41/pages/files/pressrelease092606.pdf [hereinafter Hook Fisherman Press Release].
In addition, council representatives from non-commercial fishing sectors are participating
at unprecedented levels, with an environmental representative from Environmental Defense
in positions on the Executive Committee and as Chair of the Habitat/MPA/Ecosystems
Oversight Committee, and a representative from the recreational fishing sector in positions
as council Vice Chairmen on the Executive Committee and as Chair of the Multi-Species
(Groundfish) Committee. See NEFMC, Council Members and Staff, http://www.nefmc.org/
staff/index.html. The at-large appointment held by Environmental Defense for the past
several years remains the only conservation representative currently sitting on a council in
the country. See EAGLE ET AL., supra note 17, at 24.
196. See FINAL AMENDMENT 13, supra note 1, at I-36.
197. See NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, FINAL FRAMEWORK 42 TO THE
NORTHEAST MULTISPECIES FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN AND FRAMEWORK ADJUSTMENT
3 TO THE MONKFISH FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN, INCLUDING AN ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT, REGULATORY IMPACT REVIEW, AND INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
ANALYSIS 41 (Apr. 21, 2006), available at http://www.nefmc.org/nemulti/index.html
(follow “Final Document- Framework 42 to the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management
Plan” hyperlink).
198. See NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, FINAL AMENDMENT 1 TO THE
FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR ATLANTIC HERRING, INCLUDING A FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT AND INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS
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recently, the NEFMC, sensing frustration with its historic failed approach
to groundfish management, has invited discussion of new approaches to
managing the groundfish fishery that could move the region away from its
failed approach that has allowed overfishing to continue for years.199
These changes give reason to hope that the NEFMC and NMFS will
take a proactive approach as New England enters the final phase of
developing its EFH Omnibus Habitat Amendment. If the Council applies
the same proactive approach that led to the deep-sea closures for coral
communities in the canyons off Georges Bank to other areas currently
impacted by fishing gear, it will promote healthy fish populations and make
up for existing habitat protection shortfalls. Further, as the NEFMC
considers new alternatives for groundfish management, it is likely that
additional opportunities for habitat protection may arise. These signs of
hope in New England, especially if combined with additional necessary
changes, may provide opportunities for New England’s ocean ecosystem to
return to a healthier and more sustainable status.
B. Strengthening the Habitat Provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act
After ten years of experience under the SFA amendments, it is evident
that there are several aspects of the Magnuson-Stevens Act’s habitat
provisions that require strengthening if we are to achieve its conservation
promise. Habitat protections in the form of gear modifications and habitat
closures are two important areas where significant habitat protection
progress can be made in a relatively short period of time. Bottom-tending
mobile fishing gear such as bottom trawls and dredges are widely con-

(May 3, 2006), available at http://www.nefmc.org/herring/planamen/final_a1/ha1_
fseis_may06_sec02.pdf (establishing an inshore fixed gear/purse seine only area to address
localized depletions); NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, PROPOSED
ATLANTIC HERRING SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE 2007-2009 FISHING YEARS, INCLUDING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, REGULATORY IMPACT REVIEW, AND INITIAL REGULATORY
FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS 8 (Nov. 3, 2006), available at http://www.nefmc.org/herring/
index.html (follow “What’s New” hyperlink; then follow “Proposed Atlantic Herring
Specifications for the 2007-2009 Fishing Years” hyperlink) (voting to reduce the inshore
Gulf of Maine total Allowable Catch from 60,000 mt to 50,000 mt).
199. See NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, GROUNDFISH OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE, GROUNDFISH ADVISORY PANEL, RECREATIONAL ADVISORY PANEL, WORKSHOP
SUMMARY (Nov. 6, 2006), available at http://www.nefmc.org/nemulti/pdfmeet/
groundfish_nov06.pdf; NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, NOTICE OF
SCOPING HEARINGS (Nov. 7, 2006), available at http://www.nefmc.org/nemulti/meeting_
notice/Final_Amend16_ScopingNotice.pdf; see also FINAL AMENDMENT 13, supra note 1
and accompanying text (explaining New England’s historic approach to groundfish
management).
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sidered the most destructive forms of commercial fishing gear because they
smooth critical shelter habitat and disrupt the “ecosystem engineers”— the
plants and animals that modify habitat through their activities such as
borrowing animals and hard-bodied corals. The scientific evidence regarding the negative impacts from these gears is clear and growing stronger.
The Magnuson-Stevens Act should be amended to require NMFS to
identify in each region specific areas or zones where the most destructive
gears like bottom trawls and dredging can be used. Identification of these
zones needs to be based on the recommendations of qualified scientists and
evidence indicating whether these types of fishing activities can be
conducted without significantly altering or destroying habitat and reducing
biodiversity.200 This scientific information then must be incorporated into
fishery management plans, with areas identified as not suitable for these
types of gear closed to bottom trawling and dredging. Known sensitive
habitats should be closed to such gear immediately.201 Finally, programs
should be established to support gear modifications designed to reduce
fishing gear impacts on habitat. In addition, incentives should be created
for developing gears that reduce habitat (and bycatch) impacts, with
requirements placed on each fishery management council to demonstrate
measurable progress in developing and implementing the use of such gears.
The legal mandates of the Magnuson-Stevens Act also need to be
strengthened. The standards set in each fishery management plan to avoid
or minimize adverse impacts to habitat from fishing need to be clarified and
strengthened. It is evident by the successful resistance to implementing
meaningful habitat protections that too much discretion not to act is allowed
under the current language. Court decisions under the EFH provisions
demonstrate that the current EFH provisions may not provide the legal
means needed to continue to encourage responsible action from fisheries
managers.202 Unfortunately, in 2006 there were efforts by some in Congress

200. PEW OCEANS COMM’N, supra note 8, at 47, 111-12.
201. The designation of a portion of the Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary in
Massachusetts Bay, and at each of our other thirteen National Marine Sanctuaries, as a fully
protected area, as was done within the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary, would be
an important step in promoting the use of fully protected ocean areas as a marine resource
tool. Today, the Stellwagen Bank Sanctuary is only protected from oil and gas exploration,
sand and gravel mining, and dredge and spoil disposal. 15 C.F.R. § 922.142 (2006).
202. The Magnuson-Stevens Act imposes on NMFS a duty to minimize to the extent
practicable the adverse effects on EFH. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(7) (2000). Councils have often
used the “practicable” language as part of their rationale for not taking action to protect
habitat. See MARINE FISH CONSERVATION NETWORK, supra note 110, at 23. Recent
litigation by conservationists, frustrated with the lack of measures enacted to protect EFH
in the New England scallop fishery, resulted in an adverse court opinion that left the
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in response to industry pressure to increase the amount of “flexibility” in
the law, which is a thinly masked euphemism for “unenforceability.”
We need to be able to rely on congressional leadership that is strong
enough to resist the political pressure from that part of the fishing industry
that historically does not look past their own short-term special interests.
The SFA amendments eliminated the discretion in earlier federal fisheries
management law that allowed overfishing to continue in order to
accommodate short-term economic interests at the expense of the long-term
ecological and economic health of the fishery. Although the 2006
Magnuson-Stevens Act reauthorization battle largely forced conservationists’ into a time consuming defensive effort to preserve the existing
conservation mandates of the SFA, conservationists and the new Congress
must recognize that too much is at stake given the deteriorating condition
of our oceans not to push on with significant EFH reform efforts.
C. Ecosystem-Based Management
As development pressures for scarce ocean resources intensify and
competing demands increase, marine scientists are increasingly recognizing
that we will need a more comprehensive and integrated ecosystem planning
approach to the management of all ocean-related activities, including
fisheries. In the absence of a comprehensive ocean management framework, federal and state regulators are currently responding to proposed
development and other activities on an ad hoc basis with no plan to guide
the development of the region’s ocean resources or to ensure the protection
of the underlying structure and function of the marine ecosystem. The only
way to accommodate the growing conflict between current and proposed
uses, while ensuring the ecological integrity of the marine ecosystem, is to
approach management from a comprehensive, proactive systems planning
perspective. Fishery management plans, as well as any other development
activity proposed within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone, should fit

meaning of the term “practicable” largely meaningless. See Conservation Law Found. v.
Evans, 360 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir. 2004). The plaintiffs argued that NMFS violated its
statutory obligation by rejecting the closure of the four fishing areas, arguing that NMFS’s
decision was irreconcilable with record evidence that the closures would be beneficial with
respect to EFH. Id. at 27-28. The plaintiffs called for an interpretation of the statute that
equated “practicability” more closely with “possibility,” thus requiring NMFS to implement
measures that address EFH so long as they are feasible. Id. at 28. The court rejected this
argument, rationalizing that “by using the term ‘practicable’ Congress intended to allow for
the application of agency expertise and discretion in determining how best to manage fishery
resources.” Id. at 28.
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within constraints established through more broadly-based ecosystem
management planning exercises.203
The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy recognized the need for
ecosystem-based management, stating that “[e]cosystem-based management
looks at all the links among living and nonliving resources, rather than considering single species in isolation. This system of management considers
human activities, their benefits, and their potential impacts within the
context of the broader biological and physical environment.”204 This echoes
the 1996, SFA amendments which established an Ecosystem Principles
Advisory Panel. The Panel found that the regional fishery management
councils were not adequately applying ecosystem principles and recommended that they develop “fishery ecosystem plans” (FEPs) to begin
incorporating these principles into their fishery management decisions.205
Most councils have made little progress in moving toward ecosystem-based
fisheries management.
Marine ecosystem protection should be made the organizing principle
for fishery management. The Magnuson-Stevens Act should be changed to
require FEPs, as was recommended by the Ecosystem Principles Advisory
Panel.206 Fishery management plans should be developed based upon
consideration of how the entire ecosystem that supports the fishery will be
affected by fishing. Overfishing definitions set in an ecosystem context
should consider the level of fishing that has detrimental effects in the
ecosystem, even though it may not harm a particular target species in any
given fishery. Maintenance of the long-term health of the marine ecosystem
must take precedence over short-term socio-economic development
interests. We cannot restore or sustain fisheries without restoring the ecosystem that supports them.
D. Fishery Management Council Reform
It was evident from the HAPC review process that the NEFMC’s use
of a plan development team and team of industry advisers to evaluate

203. This is the point that the Pew Oceans Commission made when it recommended that
the principal objective of fishery management should be to protect the long-term health of
fisheries “by protecting, maintaining, and restoring the health, integrity, productive capacity,
and resilience of marine ecosystems upon which they depend.” See PEW OCEANS COMM’N,
supra note 8, at 46.
204. See U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 129, at 63.
205. ECOSYSTEM PRINCIPLES ADVISORY PANEL, ECOSYSTEM-BASED FISHERY
MANAGEMENT: A REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE ECOSYSTEM PRINCIPLES ADVISORY PANEL
3, 37 (Apr. 1999), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/EPAPrpt.pdf.
206. Id.
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HAPC proposals, rather than a scientific and statistical committee filled
with independent experts in fields related to marine habitat protection,
introduced bias and confusion to the process. As a result, consideration of
the Multi-species HAPC proposal ended when a commercial fishermen
sitting on the Habitat Committee easily won a motion based on his opinion
that the science was not valid. This helps demonstrate the need for reform
of our fishery management council system. Conflicts of interest and homogeneous council representation have prevented systematic, science-based,
precautionary management.
The regional councils and council members are not well suited—either
by time or capacity—to debate scientific issues or to develop a scientific
consensus.207 The regional councils are part of a political system, designed
to bring regional fisheries knowledge to bear on the policy choices involved
in fisheries management. A clear separation should be established between
the scientific decisions related to conservation (such as decisions to set
allowable catch levels, biological reference points, and habitat protections)
and other scientific questions inherent to fisheries management and the
political decisions related to the allocation of catches and the management
measures designed to achieve the biological objectives.208
Today, the public and a number of fishing-related industries continue
to play only a limited role in managing our fisheries resources. Although
the current make-up of the NEFMC is improved, it continues to be
dominated by the same commercial fishing interests it seeks to regulate. 209
Further, there is nothing in place to ensure that the makeup of the Council
does not swing back to the same type of commercial fishing interests that
drove New England marine fish stocks to record low levels and left EFH
unprotected. Fishery management councils should be diversified to include
greater representation of public interests, including conservation and consumer interests, and fishing interests, including, seafood wholesalers and

207. In Amendment 13, however, the NEFMC asserted that the Magnuson-Stevens Act
requires councils to engage in just this activity by law. See FINAL AMENDMENT 13, supra
note 1, at I-19 to I-20 (quoting § 303(a)(10) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act).
208. See also PEW OCEANS COMM’N, supra note 8, at 109-10; U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN
POLICY, supra note 129, at 277-78; EAGLE ET AL., supra note 17, at 37-39. Ironically, the
allocation questions that are the most critical to the future of people in the fishery remain the
most difficult and the least attended-to aspects of the NEFMC’s jurisdiction.
209. See Hook Fisherman Press Release, supra note 195 and accompanying text. Note,
however, that while members with ties to the recreational fishing industry and small boat
fleet hold the Council Chair and other key positions, of twelve appointed members in New
England, eight directly represent commercial fishing interests. See also Shelley et al., supra
note 25, at 237–38 (noting the lack of representation for the full range of public interests
dealing with fisheries and conservation management in the New England Fishery Council).
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processors, recreational fishermen, and different gear and vessel types.210
Our oceans and the marine life they support are, as we know, a public
resource.
E. Ocean Conservation Areas
For a number of years now, the NEFMC has used seasonal and yearround area closures to help control fishing mortality and to limit fishing on
some stocks during critical life stages such as spawning. While the
NEFMC recently designated portions of these mortality closures as its first
year-round “habitat closures,” protecting them from the use of certain gear
types, New England’s historic use of mortality closures have proven largely
ineffective as tools for sustainable habitat protection.211 Meanwhile, marine
scientists from around the world have concluded that permanently closed
areas (fully protected areas) are necessary to protect heavily fished species,
biodiversity, and ecosystem health.212
The single most important action that could be taken to benefit the longterm health and productivity of New England’s ocean ecosystem would be
to identify and protect ecologically important and unique marine habitats
from all adverse, extractive, and disturbing human activities.213 From a
210. The need to diversify would be less critical if conservation and science decisions
were separated; however, conflict issues would remain and, in any event, broader
representation would likely increase the range of management options considered. EAGLE
ET AL., supra note 17, at 40.
211. As demonstrated by the actions taken in Amendment 13 and 10, mortality closures
are temporary and subject to change at the discretion of the NEFMC. While those portions
now designated as habitat closures carry with them a greater imprimatur of permanence by
virtue of their designation under the EFH provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, they too
are subject to revision by the NEFMC. Once reopened, a single pass by a scallop dredge or
otter trawl can undo years of recovery. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MARINE PROTECTED AREAS: TOOLS FOR
SUSTAINING OCEAN ECOSYSTEMS (2001); Worm et al., supra note 86, at 789-90; NATIONAL
CENTER FOR ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS, SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS STATEMENT
ON MARINE RESERVES AND MARINE PROTECTED AREAS (2001), available at
http://www.nceas.ucsb.edu/Consensus/consensus.pdf. See also PEW OCEANS COMM’N,
supra note 8, at 111; U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 129, at 103 (recognizing
marine protected areas as an important management tool for marine ecosystem protection).
213. See JOHN CRAWFORD ET AL., MARINE ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION FOR NEW
ENGLAND AND MARITIME CANADA: A SCIENCE-BASED APPROACH TO THE IDENTIFICATION
OF PRIORITY AREAS FOR CONSERVATION 16 (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.clf.org/
general/index.asp?id=886. Using new site selection tools and existing data, the report, by
way of example, produced a network comprised of approximately twenty percent of the Gulf
of Maine, Georges Bank, and Scotian Shelf that includes thirty different areas distributed
among those three biogeographic regions. Id. at 8-9; see also Worm et al., supra note 86,
at 89-90.
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structural perspective, this is the key gap in the current marine resource
management regime. Absent adoption of an adequate program of fully
protected ocean conservation areas, it is likely that biodiversity and the net
productivity of our ocean ecosystems will continue to decline.
The most important reason for creating an integrated network of fully
protected ocean conservation areas is to conserve locally, regionally, and
nationally significant marine biodiversity. While such biodiversity has
current and potential future commercial value, the primary justification for
protection is the biodiversity itself: a scientifically based network of fully
protected ocean conservation areas is the only way we can ensure that the
integrity of the marine ecosystem is protected.
A second reason for creating a well designed, fully protected network
of ocean conservation areas in the Gulf of Maine is to protect the core
spawning biomass of commercially important or ecologically critical fish
species in a “permanent reserve” status. Such a network would improve
sustainable fisheries management and increase predictability in the fishing
industry if a significant portion of the spawning biomass were taken out of
the fishery and put “in the bank.”
Finally, a network of fully protected ocean conservation areas would
serve as living laboratories and control sites for marine science and
management activities. The availability of such control sites is indispensable to understanding how marine ecosystems work, how human activities
impact those systems, and whether the goals of protecting biodiversity and
the spawning biomass of commercially significant species are being
achieved.
F. Reforming Ocean Governance
America’s oceans span nearly 4.5 million square miles, an area twentythree percent larger than the nation’s land area. These vast resources are
reserved under public trust principles to be managed for the public’s benefit
in perpetuity. Yet, the Pew Ocean Commission and the U.S. Commission
on Ocean Policy reports both concluded that we are at risk of losing the
many ecological, economic, and cultural benefits they provide.214 There is

214. The two ocean reports had different political origins but reached largely the same
conclusions. The Pew Oceans Commission was privately created and funded to conduct a
comprehensive review of U.S. ocean policy. The Commission was formed “to identify
policies and practices necessary to restore and protect living marine resources in [the United
States].” PEW OCEANS COMM’N, supra note 8, at ix. Congress passed a bill that empowered
the President to put together a U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy to conduct an investigation
and make recommendations. See Oceans Act of 2000 Pub. L. No. 106-256, 114 Stat. 644
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a need for new institutions to govern our relationship with the oceans and
we need to develop an eco-regional management approach that moves away
from single-species focused management to a regime that takes the entire
ecosystem into account.215
The laws and policies we use to manage our oceans are out of date and
require updating. We need to establish as the primary focus of ocean
governance ecosystem health, integrity, sustainability, and precaution if we
are to continue to enjoy the bounty and beauty they provide.216 We need a
new ocean ethic reflecting our overarching stewardship responsibility to our
oceans from which all management structures and decisions must flow,
beginning with those related to fisheries management.217
In turn, new federal laws and policies regulating topics ranging from
biodiversity protection to multi-use management planning to ocean zoning
must be implemented in order for our oceans to continue to provide the
ecological, economic, and cultural benefits on which we are dependent.
Fisheries regulation and pollution control, habitat protection, and marine
resource development have to be merged into an integrated, scientific, and
administrative framework, reflecting the interconnections between all living
things and their environments.218
IX. CONCLUSION
The Sustainable Fisheries Act has led to improvements in many,
although not all, of New England’s important commercial fish populations.
Much of this initial progress has come as a result of litigation and judicial
encouragement, although results from court decisions have been mixed and
demonstrate the need for added strength and clarity in the law to ensure that
the Act fulfills its conservation promise. The Act’s habitat provisions
provide a workable and valuable tool for protecting fish habitat, but there
is significant room for improvement.
Two prestigious U.S. ocean commissions recently reached independent
yet similar conclusions: our oceans are in trouble. Among the necessary

(2000). These were the first comprehensive reviews of our oceans in over thirty years when,
in 1969, the Stratton Commission undertook the first comprehensive review of U.S. ocean
policy. COMM’N ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES, OUR NATION AND
T H E S E A : A P LAN FO R N A T I O N A L A C T I O N ( 1 9 6 9 ) , a v a i l a b l e a t
http://www.lib.noaa.gov/edocs/stratton/title.html.
215. PEW OCEANS COMM’N, supra note 8, at x-xi.
216. Id. at x.
217. Id. at 99.
218. See Fleming et al., supra note 25, at 621.
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changes are improvements to the Magnuson-Stevens Act’s EFH provisions
in order to improve the protection of marine habitat important to
establishing sustainable fish populations.219 Unfortunately, the recent
debate over reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Act did not include
any serious consideration of new provisions that would strengthen its EFH
provisions. Conservation-minded organizations working on improving the
condition of our oceans were largely left to take comfort that the reauthorization bills considered by Congress left the EFH provisions intact. Though
this leaves us all wanting for needed reform, it may be viewed as a positive
development given the aggressive attempts to roll back other provisions of
the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and a sign that the EFH provisions will remain
a central component of U.S. fisheries management into the future. This will
at least continue to provide the opportunity to improve upon current levels
of habitat protection, and a new Congress may provide opportunities for
needed EFH reform.
The painful experiences and hard lessons from New England’s fisheries
mismanagement that have accumulated over the past decades should remind
us that the ocean’s bounty is no longer limitless and, in fact, never was.
Our stewardship responsibility runs to ourselves and to future generations,
and we must translate those hard lessons into effective management
programs that will sustain our oceans as wonderful and productive public
commons. Protecting EFH lays the ecological foundation for restoring
marine fish populations, and contributing to the high level of biodiversity
and critical range of natural habitats that are necessary to ensure that our
oceans remain healthy and sustainable for generations to come.

219. See P EW OCEANS COMM’N, supra note 8, at 47; U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY,
supra note 129, at 298.

